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Abstract
Virtual Private Network technology allows remote network users to benefit from
resources on a private network as if their host machines actually resided on the network.
However, each resource on a network may also have its own access control policies,
which may be completely unrelated to network access. Thus users’ access to a network
(even by VPN technology) does not guarantee their access to the sought resources. With
the introduction of more complicated access privileges, such as delegated access, it is
conceivable for a scenario to arise where a user can access a network remotely (because
of direct permissions from the network administrator or by delegated permission) but
cannot access any resources on the network. There is, therefore, a need for a network
access control mechanism that understands the privileges of each remote network user on
one hand, and the access control policies of various network resources on the other hand,
and so can aid a remote user in accessing these resources based on the user's privileges.
This research presents a software solution in the form of a centralized access
control framework called an Access Control Service (ACS), that can grant remote users
network presence and simultaneously aid them in accessing various network resources
with varying access control policies. At the same time, the ACS provides a centralized
framework for administrators to manage access to their resources. The ACS achieves
these objectives using VPN technology, network address translation and by proxying
various authentication protocols on behalf of remote users.

Keywords: Virtual Private Network, Access Control, Network Address Translation, and
Decentralized Delegation
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 The Big Picture

Today, the world is considered a global village because of the extensive access
the Internet provides. Without the Internet, computer networks would be isolated clusters
of interconnected machines. The Internet provides communication between these
clusters, or Local Area Networks (LANs). However, connectivity comes at a price;
without secure measures in place to check access to networks, anybody and everybody
would have access, including malicious network users looking to corrupt data, try out a
new virus or worm, or simply steal private information. Access control can be defined as
all those security measures that dictate which users can or cannot gain access to a
network, a device on the network, or an application (a program) on a device on the
network. A network is said to be private when access control restricts which network
users can or cannot access it. Typically, for a network to remain private the devices on
the network must be accessible only via a few administrative machines generally called
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gateways1; devices on a private network are connected to the rest of the Internet only
through these gateways. Similarly devices on the Internet (outside the network) can only
access network resources through these gateways.
Broadly speaking, a network resource is anything on a network that a user may
want to gain access to - a web server, a printer, a file system, an application, etc. A
network user who wishes to access resources on a private network must satisfy one or
more criteria before the gateway would grant her access. The set of criteria that the user
must satisfy is specified by the access control policy of the private network. The policy
might state that the user’s machine (called a host) should have a specific IP address (or
one of a range of IP addresses), or that the user should possess some credential (such as a
certificate) or be able to prove knowledge of some secret (a password or private key).
The process by which the gateway uses its access control policy to determine who a
network user is, in order to determine if the user should be allowed to access the private
network, is called authentication. Unfortunately, there is no uniform way by which a user
must authenticate with a gateway. While there are standards for authenticating called
protocols, there are a myriad of these. Furthermore, most of those protocols require
software support on the network user’s machine.

1

A gateway is not restricted to secure or private networks; in most LAN setups, not all devices on the network have
direct access to the Internet. Instead, there are a few devices that do (gateways) have direct access to the Internet, and
all other devices that do not have direct access communicate with the rest of the Internet through one of those that do.
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Figure 1.1-1: Resources on a network. Any device outside the cloud is considered a part of the
Internet.

More recently network users are witnessing a new class of private networks called
secure private networks or Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) [VPN04] [SBDG02]
[MSFT00] [Fra01]. Apart from using access control, the gateways to these networks
provide security to their users by encrypting information leaving or entering the network.
This security allows many devices and network users to become a part of a simulated (or
virtual) private network. These networks are ‘virtual’ or ‘simulated’ because the
resources on these networks may not be within the same LAN yet, like regular private
networks, the rest of the Internet may access these resources only through a gateway.
Similarly, devices and users that are part of the network must access the Internet through
a gateway. Because the various devices and network users of a VPN may not be on the
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same network, VPNs achieve privacy by using encryption. Even though the Internet
(generally consider public and so insecure) may exist between VPN users and resources,
the VPN gateway encrypts all network traffic that must cross the Internet. A VPN
gateway, thus, gives a network user network presence. This means that it creates the
illusion that the user’s machine is a part of some private LAN. Chapter 2 gives more
details on the technology that allows VPNs to operate.
Access control is not only restricted to network access; devices on a network, and
even the applications running on network devices may also enforce their own access
control. This can present a number of access control boundaries or network access rings.
Figure 1.1-2 below demonstrates how these rings interact. Each area within a ring
represents a network entity: for example the area in ring A may be a private network, the
area in ring B may be a machine running a network application (typically called a server
machine), and the area within ring C is the application itself.

Figure 1.1-2: Network access rings
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Each ring represents some access control policy that a network user must satisfy
to gain access to the region within it (but not necessarily beyond an internal ring). In
large networks, the manager of the network’s gateway (called the administrator) - and
thus the overseer of its access control policies - may not be the manager of the servers on
the network. Because of this, access control policies are not typically synchronized. By
this, I mean that the ability of a network user to satisfy the access control policy of ring A
does not guarantee that she would be able to satisfy that of ring B as well. A sequence of
rings as described above creates a hierarchy of access control that a network user must
satisfy if she wishes to use an application in the region within ring C. The differentiation
of access control by the network gateway, individual server machines on the network,
and even applications on these machines, allows network resource administrators the
freedom to decide who can or cannot use their resources. For remote users, however,
these rings can be an impediment: because a remote network user may not be using the
same host each time she connects to the network, she is now faced with ensuring that the
host she uses at any one time can understand all the protocols and has all the credentials
needed for each ring of access control.
Consider this scenario of a network user, Alice, and her colleague at work, Bob.
Bob is the administrator for some server machine on the work LAN. Alice would like to
be able to access some files on this machine, so Bob allows her to pick a username and
password, and installs a Kerberos [NT94] [KN93] client application on her desktop at
work. Kerberos is an authentication protocol that applications may use for access control.
Kerberos requires that a network user’s machine have a client application to present the
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user’s credentials – in this case the credentials are a username and password pair2. Alice
can now access these files from her desktop at work because Bob has authorized her to
do so. However, when she gets home later on and decides to continue the work she
started during the day she realizes that Bob’s Kerberos server would no longer allow her
to retrieve her files. Naturally, her desktop at home lacks the Kerberos client, and so she
realizes that her ability to access her files on Bob’s machine is not just a consequence of
who she is nor of the password and username she alone knows – it is also dependent on
whether the machine she chooses to work from has the right applications installed.
In some cases, administrators may not want users to access a resource from just
any host: within their own LANs these administrators may have some control over the
state of each machine (whether the machine has a keystroke logger3 installed for
instance!) but cannot possibly know that of any remote machine. Bob could not have had
such a measure in mind anyway because if Alice still wanted access from home she
would ‘only’ have to find and install the Kerberos client on her home computer. I quote
‘only’ because the difficulty of such a procedure depends on the availability of the
software and the ease of installation. For instance, even where the client support for a
protocol (such as Kerberos’ client applications) can be downloaded at no cost to a
network user, installing the application might be quite an inconvenience for the average
computer user.
Sometimes, it is not the case that administrators wish to restrict network users to
computers with particular applications and credentials, or to specific locations. Instead,
2

The Kerberos client does not actually present the username and password for authentication with the server; it uses
them to obtain a digital ‘ticket’ that becomes the credential for authentication instead.
3
A keystroke Logger is the generic name given to a program that can record characters a user types in some other
application. Malicious users usually plant such programs onto machines with the intention of recording sensitive
information like usernames and passwords.
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some of these restrictions occur because access control policies depend on varying
protocols, all of which require some software support that not every computer might
have.
The following further illustrate current problems with access control. In most of these
examples an administrator has granted a user access (the user is ‘authorized’) but the user
is hindered by policy requirements. In others, access control policies simply do not
capture the range of things a user would like to be able to do with their privileges:

1. Alice belongs to a team of consultants on the second floor of her office building.
All of her team members keep their work files on the same file system server.
Bob, the system administrator for their server, knows that the second floor
computers all have IP addresses within a particular IP range. Each team member
may access their files only after successfully supplying her specific username and
password. Bob is an experienced administrator and understands that malicious
users can more easily compromise usernames and passwords than they can many
other authentication schemes. To improve the security of the server, he adds a
firewall4 that ensures that only connections originating from machines with one of
the second floor IP addresses will be allowed to further communicate with the
server. This is a typical IP-based (firewall) access control scheme for a device (in
this case the server machine). While this provides some amount of security, it is
really an inconvenience for the consulting team that would love to be able to work

4

A ‘firewall’ is a set of access control rules that restrict access to a device based on information about a user’s network
traffic. Firewalls differ from other access control schemes in that they do not require the user to use an authentication
procedure or protocol. They are typically used for preliminary access control only as a first line of defense from
unwanted access.
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from home. Even though Alice can get onto her work VPN she cannot access her
team’s server, which is really the only reason she wants to get onto her office’s
network in the first place.
2. Alice and her colleagues can check their profiles (personal information accounts)
online. Charlie is the administrator for the web server that houses the profiles web
site. Charlie understands that Alice and the other consultants may need to access
their profiles outside work so he does not use IP-based firewalls. At the same time
he also wants these profiles to be as secure as possible so would rather not use a
username/password scheme. Instead, he sets up SSL authentication on his web
server, requiring that the consultants’ web browsers present a certificate, and
prove knowledge of an associated private key for authorization. This is a PKI5
(client-side SSL) access control approach for an application (in this case the web
server). This approach is probably more flexible than Bob’s but is an
inconvenience to Alice who uses Internet Explorer 5.2 (the latest version of IE on
Macintosh) on her Mac, which doesn’t support client-side SSL authentication.
What is more, it requires that the consultants have their private key and certificate
installed on every browser they wish to use for accessing the web site. Again in
this scenario, having access to their company’s VPN does not buy the team much
unless they meet the web server ’s access control requirements.
3. Alice’s team is currently dealing with a client, New Tech Co. New Tech has a
VPN and has granted the team temporary access to its network. New Tech is
using VPN access control for their network. Unfortunately New Tech’s VPN

5

PKI stands for Private Key Infrastructure. It is a term used for authentication based on public/private key pairs,
certificates, and authorizing agents that issues these certificates.
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concentrator uses the SSL6 protocol for encryption. Alice’s machine at home only
has an IPSec VPN client because her workplace has an IPSec VPN and that is all
she is used to. Alice’s colleague, Denise, must deal with a different
inconvenience: Unlike Alice, the VPN client on Denise’s computer at home
supports both SSL and IPSec protocols. However, Denise’s VPN client can
connect to only one VPN at any given time. This is an inconvenience for her
because she would like to use some applications on her work VPN while
retrieving files from New Tech’s VPN.
4. Consider Eugene, a student at college. Eugene is going to be away in a foreign
country next term, and he will not have frequent access to email. At the same
time, he is expecting replies from potential employers and so would like to
monitor his college’s email account. What Eugene would like to do is have Felix,
his best friend, monitor his email and call him up if he receives word from a
potential employer. Now Eugene would really like Felix to be able to monitor the
account until he gets back, and no longer than that. How does he do this without
telling Felix his account password? Like most average web users, Eugene uses the
same password for so many other accounts and he really wouldn’t like Felix to be
able to access those as well. Like most web services, the college’s email access
control policy has no notion of temporary or guest access.

6

Please see Chapter 2 for more details about both the SSL and IPSec protocols
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In all of these examples7 the problems that the users face are not unsolvable:
Eugene could resolve to practice better password habits, and change his other accounts to
use different passwords, Denise and Alice could find and install another VPN client that
handled both IPSec and SSL protocols and could simultaneously connect to multiple
VPNs. Alice could get a different browser, for her Macintosh, one that supports clientside SSL. Charlie could issue portable USB tokens that carry the consultants PKI
credentials to make accessing the web site more flexible. The administrator for the
workplace’s VPN could set up the DHCP server to issue the consultants’ IP addresses
within the range of those for machines on the second floor.
However, most of these solutions can be an inconvenience to the parties involved:
How many accounts must Eugene fix-up and how many ‘strong’8 passwords can he
remember? How comfortable are Denise and Alice with installing applications and how
difficult would it be to install the client they need? How flexible is Alice at using another
browser, other than Internet Explorer? What would it cost Charlie to get those portable
tokens for the consultants and what learning curve must the consultants go through to
become comfortable with these devices?
Neither do most of the solutions scale very well: Eugene may get more accounts
in the future, just how many can he keep with unique passwords and will he ever have to
allow some other friend to access one of these in the future? What happens when VPN
technology requires some other protocol other than IPSec and SSL and where does the
introduction of new VPN protocols end? Which platforms or operating systems support
7

Any technologies that might be unfamiliar to the reader are further explained in Chapter 2 and the
glossary section of this paper.
8
The definition for a ‘strong’ password is rather ambiguous, but generally passwords that have many
characters (8 or more), and include numbers and non-alphanumeric symbols are considered ‘stronger’ than
those that do not.
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Charlie’s tokens and do all of these have drivers already installed on them? What happens
if another administrator, Gina, decides to use IP-based filtering, and what if Alice
happens to be in the group that uses Gina’s server machine as well? From which IP
address range would the VPN administrator assign Alice’s address, the second floor’s or
that for the team that uses Gina’s server machine?
In this paper I introduce an access control solution, called the Access Control
Service, or ACS for short. The ACS provides a VPN service, so like other VPN gateways
it provides network presence for remote users. The ACS also manages user account
information and so is aware of what privileges each user has. The ACS provides a
centralized framework for resource administrators to autonomously control access to their
resources. The ACS is also able to facilitate remote-user access to resources on the VPN
by establishing connections to these resources on behalf of VPN users. The ACS is,
therefore, a mediator between a remote network user, and the resources that she is
authorized to access. Because the ACS mediates on behalf of the remote user, a remote
user will be able to access network resources for which she has permission irrespective of
the particular host she might be using at any time.
Also because the ACS is an intermediary, it becomes the ACS’s responsibility to
be able to interoperate between various protocol versions and machine capabilities; each
resource administrator only has to ensure that the ACS can satisfy the resource’s access
policies.
Some of the work of the Greenpass team at Dartmouth has shown that delegated
access to a network can be extended to VPNs as well [Goff04]. Unfortunately, in the light
of the problems highlighted above, and in the absence of any delegated access control
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schemes for individual network resources, delegated access to VPNs may not be of much
use. The previous work on delegated VPN access, however, points out that VPN users
may be authorized either by direct permission from an administrator or by delegated
permission from another authorized user. This suggests that resources on a VPN must be
able to accommodate both types of users if delegation should be seamless across the
network. The ACS framework provides a solution for this problem: the ACS can
incorporate Greenpass tools for determining delegated users’ privileges, establish
connections with resources on the VPN, and allow authorized delegated users to access
these resource via the established connections. Since the ACS is an intermediary between
delegated users and these resources, administrators may not have to make major to their
access control systems in order to accommodate decentralized delegated access.

Summary

While VPN technology offers authorized users network presence, it does not cater
for the varying access policies on the network. This means that being able to obtain
network presence via VPN access control may not benefit a remote user much because
the target resources may require further authentication that her remote host may not be
able to satisfy. These restrictions also mean that changes to the access policy of a
resource on a private network may suddenly prevent an authorized remote user from
accessing this resource. Thus user access no longer becomes based on who the user is but
on what the user’s host has or can do at any given time. Access protocols are typically
meant to establish a user’s identity and/or to ascertain a user’s privileges. However,
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where a user’s host does not correctly support an access protocol, these protocols end up
restricting access. Consequently, such restrictions present an inconvenience to both users
and resource administrators. At the same time simply changing the access control policies
for these resources cannot be the solution because: (1) network users are necessarily
restricted by the capabilities and possessions of their host machines. (2) access control
policies are designed with more than just authorized VPN users in mind. They are
therefore necessary for providing security to these resources. A solution lies in a
mediating service that understands the privileges of each remote user and the access
control policies of their target resources on the VPN. By proxying authorized access, the
ACS can alleviate the inconveniences caused by network access rings as well as provide
a platform for introducing other network-wide technologies including decentralized
delegated access.

1.2 Motivation

The motivation for this work arises from a rather interesting problem that exists
on the Dartmouth College network, but similar cases exist on many other networks that
use IP-based access control schemes for secured server machines. A secured server
machine is a computer that runs a number of services and is secured by some access
control policies; it only allows authorized users to make connections to the services it
runs. At Dartmouth, there exist a number of server machines that enforce access control
policies requiring that an authorized user possess an IP address within a particular
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address range. Thus, these machines perform preliminary authentication by IP-filtering
(firewalls), i.e. the access control policy allows only users with specific IP addresses to
connect to the server machine (or, alternatively, users with specific IP addresses are
disallowed access). The problem with IP-filtering is that it is not the most sophisticated
scheme for securing a computer; a malicious user need only spoof an IP address to be
considered authorized to make a connection. Alternatively, malicious users can thwart the
policy by employing a number of packet fragmentation attacks [ZRT95]. A network
packet is a unit of network data. Because these computers discriminate purely based on
the IP address of the connection requestor, a number of problems may arise:

1. Most host machines on the network use dynamically assigned IP addresses so in
order for the host to connect to one of these server machines it must be assigned
the appropriate IP address. A problem arises when a particular host desires to
access more than one of these machines with non-overlapping IP address ranges.
2. When a user has permission to access two of these machines, system
administrators may use overlapping IP address pools so that the overlaps
represent users with access to both machines. This obviously doesn’t scale well
when a user is authorized to access three or more of these server machines.
3. Network Administrators may then decide to split the local address space into
ranges corresponding to privilege classes, where each privilege class represents a
permutation of the permissions a user has. Here problems include scaling the IP
range to accommodate changes in the number of users in the corresponding class,
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and adding or removing server machines that work on this access protocol
scheme.
4. Alternatively, the administrator may create access control lists (ACLs) for each
server, listing some fixed IP addresses to which each server may grant (or deny)
access. This approach may reintroduce the problem of multiple permissions
identified in (1) if servers do not share IP addresses. Consequently, a number of
these servers may have overlapping IP addresses that represent the intersection of
their users. Again, this approach makes modifying user privileges rather
cumbersome because an administrator must modify the ACLs of each server for
which the user has access permissions.
5. Access control based purely on IP addresses does not work well with temporary
access permissions. It usually involves the administrator modifying ACLs for a
number of computers, or adding new IP addresses to secure server machines, and
then undoing the process when the privileges expire.

At the same time filtering connections by IP addresses has advantages that make
this approach a welcome choice even with the existence of more sophisticated ones.
Amongst these, perhaps one of the more motivating factors is that packet filtering by IP
addresses is done in the computer’s kernel (the part of the operating system that directly
interacts with hardware) so can be executed very quickly. Other approaches require user
authentication that may require userland applications (applications that run on top of the
operating system) and protocols that are considerably slower. Thus many of these server
machines only use IP-filtering for preliminary authentication; further application-level
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authentication might be carried out by individual services after the machine accepts a
network packet from a user. Thus IP-filtering serves to reduce the number of users a
server must authenticate in a slower way.
Nonetheless, because of its associated problems outlined above, and the
vulnerabilities mentioned earlier, the problems of maintaining access control by IPfiltering can very quickly outweigh its use as a security measure in larger networks. For
many networks, including Dartmouth’s, administrators have not considered eliminating
IP-based access control or adopting more sophisticated schemes for a number of reasons:
1. The network does not yet have too many of these server machines, so
maintenances has not yet become unbearable. On the Dartmouth Network, there
are almost 20 such computers though administrators admit that this number is
growing.
2.

The network is still not so big that there are too many overlapping users or a lack
of IP address ranges to specify new overlaps.

3. Guest access has not yet become an issue or has never really been considered.

While these are valid arguments they all assume that the network will not expand or
require more sophisticated access control (like delegated access).

The Dartmouth network employs a VPN concentrator as a gateway to most of
these server computers. At the time of researching the above problems, I was also
researching VPN usage on the network and its integration with delegation tools [Goff04].
An approach to mitigating the problem of maintaining IP-based policies for secured
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server machines is presented in the ACS mentioned earlier. The ACS makes use of the
authentication provided by VPN technology, as well as network address translation
functionality to ensure that authorized users always meet the IP policy of the secure
server machine. All this functionality is configurable so can be modified to reflect the
correct freedoms and restrictions that remote users would experience had they been
locally present on the network.

1.3 Goals of the ACS project

The goals of the Access Control Service are:

1. To enhance VPN user access by reducing undesired access control restrictions to
network resources. These restrictions are those due to protocols that a remote host
may not be able to handle or policies the remote host cannot meet even though the
remote user has access privileges.

2. To facilitate maintenance of the access control systems for several resources,
perhaps under the supervision of several administrators, by providing a
centralized framework defining the privileges of users and user-groups in
accessing resources and resource-groups. Sine the ACS is an intermediary in the
network-access process administrators can modify user and user-group privileges
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on the ACS to reflect permission changes without having to change individual
access control policies on multiple network resources.

3. To provide a centralized framework for introducing network-wide access control
technologies and schemes such as decentralized delegation of resource access.

1.4 Organization, Style and Formatting of this document

Throughout this document the word ‘I’ is used in contexts where I am referring to
work I did ‘on my own.’ I quote this phrase because while I coded up, put components
together and wrote this document, I acknowledge the very helpful suggestions and input
of my advisor and others (see Acknowledgements section). I use ‘we’ when I mean to
engage the reader in discussion as in “we have previously identified a number of
issues…” Where I use ‘we’ in this context, I will make it as clear as possible that it refers
to the reader and I.
I will refer the reader to sections within the Background Chapter (Chapter 2)
each time I make reference to some technology that I believe the reader might not be
acquainted with. When I introduce a term for the first time I will italicize it. I will
endeavor to further explain the term almost immediately after its introduction. If I do not
immediately provide a definition for one of these terms, then a definition is included in
the Glossary section of this paper. I may also place a term in quotes if I believe the term
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is familiar to the average reader but might require further explanation in the particular
context. If I have to make an emphasis, I will underline a phrase to emphasize it.
I generally use the term ‘server machine’ to refer to the physical device that
accepts connections and provides a number of services (like the ACS). I use the term
‘server’ to refer to the specific service application on a machine. I will use the term
‘client’ in two ways: (1) the application on a host that can understand a protocol required
for connecting to a server. (2) A remote user who connects to a network server. I have
already used client in the first form in this chapter. The context will make either use
relatively unambiguous to the reader.
I use ‘public,’ ‘insecure,’ and ‘less trusted’ synonymously when referring to
networks. The underlying idea in all three cases is that any device on the Internet can
intercept traffic on such a network so there is no confidentiality. Second, in the absence
of encryption, the integrity of the data through this network cannot be guaranteed.
Likewise, I use ‘private’ and ‘trusted’ synonymously; devices on the Internet are less
likely to intercept traffic on such networks. Devices within these networks may, however,
be able to intercept the traffic.

The paper is divided into chapters based on the nature of the information I will be
presenting:

Chapter 2 highlights the main technologies employed by the ACS project. I strongly
encourage the reader to at least skim this chapter before reading about the project itself.

19

Chapter 3 presents the model for the ACS as well as detailing the design and
implementation of my prototype for the framework.
Chapter 4 discusses some of my thoughts on the current implementation with regard to
security, usability and efficiency. These discussions also touch on my ideas for improving
the prototype as well as the overall model.
Chapter 5 presents other research pertaining to network access control management and
delegated access for network users.
Chapter 6 is the conclusion to the work presented in this paper.

1.5 Related Documents

This project was built upon Nick Goffee’s experiment on delegated access and
VPNs [Goff04]. His experiment was carried out as part of a larger thesis related to the
Greenpass Project at Dartmouth. The Greenpass team has submitted a number of papers
on this project [SGK+04a] [SGK+04b], and there have been two masters’ theses [Goff04]
[Kim04] on the development of the RADIUS server and Client Tools components, as
well as an undergraduate thesis [Pow04]. More information about Greenpass is provided
in Chapter 2.
Jacco De Leeuw [DeL02] has an online document about setting up Linux VPN
servers using open source tools.
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Chapter 2
Background

2.1 Virtual Private Networks

2.1.1 Definitions
VPNs are private networks made by one or more connections over a public
network infrastructure (the Internet). VPNs are typically accessible by means of one or
more entry points called Points of Presence (POP). Figure 2.1.1-1 below shows a typical
VPN setup for an organization with access capabilities for a regional branch, a remote
business client, a partner and a remote employee.
In most organizations, a concentrator authenticates users before they gain VPN
access. In network terms, a concentrator is a device that “allows a number of stations to
be connected to a LAN” [Wob97]. In the case of a VPN concentrator, this ‘LAN’ is the
VPN, and the ‘stations’ are remote network devices. The term ‘VPN server’ defines
software on a machine (a gateway) that accepts connections from a remote host to enable
the host to access other services on a private network. VPN servers traditionally run on
PC and Mac server machines, Solaris workstations etc. As the machines running the
server are not specialized for routing traffic, or handling larger volumes of connections,
VPN servers are typically used on gateways to smaller subnets rather than the entire
networks. Traditionally, ‘VPN concentrators’ refer to devices specialized for VPN access
control; they may audit and monitor connections more efficiently and provide hardware
support for encryption and increased connection throughput.
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Figure 2.1.1-1: A VPN setup for a corporation, its employees, partners and clients.

VPN servers can be ‘inward-facing’, ‘outward-facing’, or both. Outward-facing
servers are the public interface to a virtual private network; they receive incoming
connections and forward data from remote machines to devices on the VPN and to the
rest of the Internet. Inward-facing servers are the gateways for devices within the VPN;
they forward packets from within the VPN to the rest of the Internet and tunnel packets
destined for other servers.
VPN connections are usually referred to by the traffic that is encrypted between
the two hosts on either ends of the connection. In the most basic form, a VPN connection
encrypts only those packets destined for one of the two hosts. This configuration is called
a host-to-host VPN. Second, a client may connect to a server for access to only the subnet
behind the server’s host (the gateway). In this configuration, called a host-to-subnet VPN,
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the client’s traffic to the rest of the world remains unencrypted, only packets destined for
hosts on the remote subnet get encrypted. The third type of configuration is the host-toanywhere VPN. Under this setup, all the client’s network traffic gets encrypted and sent
to the VPN server, even those packets that are destined for hosts outside the VPN subnet.
The VPN server will typically forward these packets to the rest of the Internet.
In all cases, VPN connections are considered to offer complete site-to-site
encryption [Hos04]. ‘Complete site-to-site encryption’ means that all data between the
VPN client’s host and the VPN server’s host is encrypted.
Closely related to VPNs are ‘virtual LANs’ (VLANs). VLANs are network
devices that are clustered based on logic rather than geographical location. These devices
maintain connections among themselves using software configurations. This allows a
device to remain a part of the VLAN even after its physical location is changed. The
fundamental difference between a VLAN and a VPN is that the definition of a VLAN
does not consider security or privacy.
In networking, ‘tunneling’ refers to “the practice of encapsulating a message from
one protocol in another, and using the facilities of the second protocol to traverse some
number of network hops” [CBR03]. The VPN Consortium’s white paper [VPN04]
defines three VPN tunneling technologies; trusted VPNs, secure VPNs, and hybrid VPNs.
•

Trusted VPN tunneling is equivalent to private leased-lines technology; a corporation
that employs a trusted VPN makes use of a network provider’s private network nodes,
such as switches and routers, with the agreement that the provider ensures the
integrity and privacy of data through the network.
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•

Secure VPNs make use of publicly-available circuitry and so they must employ
encryption to achieve the same effect as trusted VPNs.

•

Hybrid VPNs, as the name suggests, make use of both private network circuits and
encryption.

Tunneling (with or without encryption) can be achieved by a number of protocols.
This section will cover four of these protocols: IPSec, L2TP, PPTP and SSL.

2.1.2 IPSec
The Internet Protocol Security (RFC 2401-2411, 2451 Standards Track) is an
Internet Draft Standard that was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) to ensure secure transfer of information on a public IP network [Fra01]. IPSec is a
per-packet security implementation that consists of two independent protocols: The
Authentication Header (AH) [KA98a], and the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP)
[KA98b]. Both protocols describe the IP header extensions for sending and receiving
protected datagrams. ESP provides privacy through encryption (and optionally integrity)
while AH provides packet integrity and authentication [SBDG02]. The IPSec protocol
also specifies the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [HC98], which is used for
authenticating, and for establishing session keys between two sites before any other data
is transmitted.
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Figure 2.1.2-1: IPSec information part of IP packet

IPSec specifies two modes of applying protection:
1. Transport mode adds IPSec information (ESP or AH) between the IP header and the
remainder of the packet.

Figure 2.1.2-3: IPSec using ESP in Transport Mode

2. Tunnel mode adds a new IP header to the original IP packet, and keeps the IPSec
information outside.
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Figure 2.1.2-2: IPSec using ESP in Tunnel Mode

A security association (SA) is a relationship between two or more entities that
defines how each entity will use security parameters and services to communicate
securely [KPS02]. An IPSec SA is a cryptographic key and other information including
the identity of the host on the other end of a connection, the sequence number currently
being used, and the ‘cryptographic services’ being used [KPS02]. The ‘cryptographic
services’ tell each end such information as whether to use integrity only (AH), or
encryption and integrity (ESP / AH + ESP), and which cryptographic algorithms to use.
The purpose of IKE is to establish an SA between two parties. SA information on each
IPSec connections is stored in an SA database and indexed by a security parameter index
(SPI) that is included in the header of each IPSec packet (see figure A.1) and is unique
for each connection to a given IPSec server.

2.1.3 PPTP
The Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (RFC 2637) is a layer-2 protocol built on
Point-to-Point protocol (PPP) and TCP/IP. PPP is a mechanism for creating and running
the Internet Protocol (IP) and other network protocols over a serial link – be that a direct
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serial connection (using a modem cable), over a telnet established link, or a link made
using modems and telephone lines (or digital lines) [LDOC]. PPP allows authentication,
privacy and data compression, and is commonly used in dial-up Internet connections via
modem and phone lines. PPTP tunnels a PPP session through IP connections and so
benefits from the security provided by PPP while using IP infrastructure. PPTP thus
allows the transmission of packets that do not support IPv4 or IPv6 addressing standards.
The vendor consortium responsible for developing this protocol includes Microsoft, US
Robotics, and 3Com but the Microsoft implementation appears to be most widely used.
PPTP uses a variety of protocols for authentication and encryption. Authentication
protocols include Password Authentication Protection (PAP), Challenge Handshake
Authentication Protocol (CHAP), and MS-CHAP (A Microsoft adaptation of the original
CHAP). Encryption algorithms typically employed include RSA, RC4, and DES.

2.1.4 L2TP
Cisco Systems and Microsoft developed the Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol (RFC
2661) to combine the advantages of PPTP and an older Cisco layer-2 tunneling protocol
called Layer 2 Forwarding (L2F). L2TP enables the transmission of PPP datagrams over
IP, X.25, Frame Relay and ATM networks, and allows the establishment of multiple
tunnels between the same endpoints [Fra01].
A typical L2TP implementation consists of two services; the L2TP Access
Concentrator (LAC) and the L2TP Network Sever (LNS), and two tunneling modes;
Voluntary or Compulsory. The LNS is the endpoint of an L2TP connection and the LAC
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is the intermediate service that routes packets between the LNS and a remote host at the
other end of the connection. The LAC is able to receive non-IP connections and tunnels
PPP datagrams to the LNS for authentication. The LNS receives L2TP connections from
the LAC, processes PPP datagrams, uses PPP authentication to validate users, and assigns
IP addresses. In compulsory tunneling mode, a client dials into an Internet Service
Provider using a PPP connection. The ISP partially authenticates the client to establish
which account to open, and then the LNS validates the client and assigns an IP address.
Voluntary mode is very similar to compulsory mode only that the client already has a
pre-establish connection to an ISP so no partial authentication is required.
L2TP uses Network Control Protocol (NCP) for assigning IP addresses and
authenticates using PPP authentication schemes (CHAP or PAP) in order to control
network access. L2TP is primarily concerned with user authentication, and the
confidentiality and integrity of information between L2TP endpoints. L2TP does not
provide replay protection.

2.1.5 Comparisons
Authentication provided by L2TP and PPTP is user-based and occurs during
tunnel establishment only. Neither provides authentication of a packet’s origin thus both
lack replay protection. IPSec authentication is host- rather than user-based, because IPSec
only identifies packets by IP addresses after a tunnel is established9 [KPS02]. IPSec
provides replay protection through origin authentication and by maintaining sequence
numbers of each packet in an SA database. However, IPSec does not support dynamic

9

IPSec servers can potentially handle multiple connections between the same end points because they
identify connections by SPI rather than IP addresses. However, most IPSec clients do not allow this.
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configuration of parameters after the tunnel is formed [RS02] because once the SA is
established each end of the connection must remain true to initial agreement during the
IKE phase otherwise one end point will reject the others packets.
IPSec/L2TP (pronounced IPSec over L2TP) is typically used for VPN
implementations. IPSec over L2TP combines the replay protection advantage of IPSec
with the user-based authentication and routing ability of L2TP. This allows roadwarriors
(mobile devices with non-fixed IP addresses), which may not have IP addresses prior to
establishing a connection, to use IPSec/L2TP.

2.1.6 SSL
Netscape first introduced the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol for securely
sending messages over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). HTTP is the native
protocol of the World Wide Web and so SSL was initially intended specifically for
browser use. The protocol has existed for several years now (Netscape released the first
official version, SSLv2 in 1994) and has developed in security and feature. Currently, the
IETF’s standard for SSL is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which is a
modified version of SSLv3.

2.1.7 SSL VPNs
Unlike the previous protocols, SSL was not designed with layer 2 and 3
encryption in mind, but rather transport-layer encryption. There are four methods by
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which SSL VPNs may provide access: proxying, application translation, port forwarding
and network extension. Some implementations may use more than one of these:

I. Proxying
An application proxy is a service that sits between a client and remote server and acts as
an intermediary between the two for a particular application. The proxy usually receives
data from one end (client or server), may rewrite this data in some way (including
encrypting or decrypting it), and then forward the data on to the other end. These proxies
are commonly called Application Level Gateways (ALGs). A web proxy is an ALG that
handles HTTP requests between a client and server. ALGs typically proxy a small subset
of applications because they are protocol-dependent. Consequently, proxying cannot
offer complete site-to-site encryption that is desired in a VPN.

II. Application Translation
Protocols like FTP can be adapted to other protocols like HTTP (used by web browsers).
Proxy servers can do this translation on behalf of clients, in order to handle requests to
servers. However, more complicated protocols, like the one employed by Windows File
Sharing, are less readily translatable. This mechanism, like proxying, is protocol-specific
and cannot offer complete site-to-site encryption.

III. Port Forwarding

30

Port forwarding is a type of network address translation typically used by servers to
balance load. A host machine may receive a packet on one port and forward it to a port of
another machine.

IV. Network Extension
This is the use of a tunnel to join two hosts at the network layer. Such tunnels do not
discriminate based on application protocols because they built below the application
layer.

SSL VPNs that use network extension can successfully encrypt all data between
two hosts and so are regarded as ‘true’10 VPNs [Hos04]. I will use OpenVPN, considered
a ‘true’ SSL VPN [Hos04], to explain how SSL VPNs work:
OpenVPN [Yon04] is an open source SSL VPN implementation created by James
Yonan. OpenVPN uses the OpenSSL libraries and is available on all the common
computing platforms (Windows XP, Mac OS X, and Linux). OpenVPN uses virtual
interfaces, much like PPP does. It supports two virtual interfaces, a tun interface, which is
a tunnel interface just like PPP’s, and a tap interface. The tun interface routes IP packets,
while the tap interface routes Ethernets packets. Each interface has a virtual device
driver. The device driver is a user-land application that processes packets sent to the
interface. Before the virtual interfaces are created, OpenVPN will perform a SSL
handshake with the remote host. This handshake is a client-SSL authentication handshake
so both ends of the tunnel get authenticated. Once the connection is established, packets
can be routed to the remote host. Because the tun and tap interfaces are network
10

SSL VPNs are considered ‘true’ VPNS if they provide complete site-to-site encryption
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interfaces the host operating system sends them entire IP (or Ethernet packets), not just
application layer data as it would a regular process doing SSL encryption. The driver
receives these packets and encrypts them employing algorithms from the OpenSSL
library (DES, 3DES, AES, etc). It then re-encapsulates the new packet in a UDP packet,
addresses this packet to the remote host, and sends it onto the network.
Unlike IPSec servers, tunneling is done over UDP rather than plain IP. The reason
for this is that OpenVPN (and any other SSL VPN implementation for that matter) does
not have kernel support, so it must listen on a specific port to receive VPN packets.
Tunneling is done over UDP, as opposed to TCP, because the encrypted (tunneled)
packet may already be a TCP packet; tunneling TCP over TCP can cause network slowdowns because each TCP layer must handle resending requests when a packet is lost, and
each layer must ensure that packets come in order.
SSL VPNs have a number of advantages over IPSec (or IPSec/L2TP) VPNs.
Perhaps most notable amongst these is that they do not require any modification to a host
machine’s kernel stack. This advantage appears to make them much easier to install and
configure, and allows them to operate more easily between different platforms [Yon04].
As a disadvantage, SSL VPNs are less common and less widely used by organizations.
Due to this SSL VPNs have a lot fewer router and hardware support than their IPSec
counterparts. One reason the public might have been so slow to pick up SSL VPN
technology is that there is a common misconception that SSL only works at the
application layer so cannot provide more than per application security [Hos04].
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2.2 Network Address Translation

The necessity of NAT arises from the inability of IPv4 to provide enough
addresses for the Internet [CBR03]. NAT tries to circumvent this limitation by
constructing a many-to-one mapping of IP addresses within a local network so that
machines on this network appear to be sharing the same IP address on the Internet. The
way a NAT box (the device doing Network Address Translation) achieves this varies from
implementation to implementation, but the common approach is to assign all outgoing
traffic (packets leaving the local network) the IP address of the NAT box, and multiplex
incoming traffic (packets entering the local network) by mapping destination ports to
machines on the local network.

2.2.1 Problems associated with NAT
Most of the problems with NAT arise from the fact that some application
protocols (e.g. FTP) use IP addresses in remote commands at the application layer. These
IP-address references are not readily obvious to a NAT box so may be left untranslated
and cause problems to the applications. NAT implementations must, therefore, handle
FTP packets specially in order to circumvent this problem. This introduces a system
where NAT boxes have to handle packets on a protocol-by-protocol basis, which is not
very scalable.
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Second, because the source IP addresses of outgoing packets are modified, hosts
behind a NAT box cannot readily act as servers; remote clients would not have a static
public address to which to connect. This particular problem also affects applications that
ignore server-client models in favor of ‘peer-to-peer’ connection (e.g. voice over IP, Xwindows) because such applications require that either side be able to accept a
connection (both sides of the connection are clients and servers at the same time).
Third, the process of translating IP headers introduces extra overhead to data
packet flow on the Internet. Furthermore, translating addresses violates the standards of
some security protocols such as IPSec; IPSec enforces packet integrity and under the AH
protocol IPSec requires that the IP header remains unchanged throughout the packets
transmission. NAT easily violates this standard because it requires that packets be
modified at least at the header level [KPS02]. While there are some implementations of
IPSec that permit NAT boxes to modify headers, such implementations introduce extra
complexity to IPSec usage and still cannot accommodate some packet tampering that
NAT requires. For instance, some NAT implementations handle FTP packets by
tampering with application layer information. Application layer data falls within the
payload of a typical IP packet and so is considered un-modifiable according to the IPSec
protocols.

2.2.2 Practical applications of NAT
NAT has become almost crucial in solving certain problems of security and
balancing load for servers and databases [Vep02]. A server may use NAT to hand off
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packets destined for it to clone servers on other machines to deal with. This allows a
server at a single IP address to balance client load. This scheme is used to handle high
volumes of database queries. Additionally, NAT is used to provide a single gateway to
multiple machines. Such a setup is called masquerading or ‘many-to-one natting11’. The
reasoning behind this configuration is that it is easier to secure one gateway to the
Internet than multiple ones. Thus firewall rules applied to the single gateway provide
security to all the masqueraded machines. Masquerading is also used to protect the
identity and activity of machines on a network.
NAT is becoming more and more popular in establishments like airports and
hotels. In such establishments, rather than register an entire subnet of public IP addresses,
the establishment offers the patrons local addresses (like 10.0.0.1) and a NAT box
masquerades outgoing traffic for them with a few public IP addresses. This setup is much
more cost effective for these enterprises. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) has provided three IP address ranges for local network use [RMKGL96]. These
address ranges are given in Table 2.2.2-1.

Start address

End address

10.0.0.0

10.255.255.255

172.16.0.0

172.31.255.255

192.168.0.0

192.168.255.255

Table 2.2.2-1 IANA assigned address spaces for local networks

11

‘Nat’ is sometimes used as a verb and means, “to do a network address translation.”
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2.3 Linux Packet Routing

2.3.1 Definitions
Packet routing allows a machine to discriminate between packets it receives or
transmits. This permits a host machine to behave like a regular network router. In many
cases, packet routing enables a host to also make other decisions about packets including
modifying packet header information such as time-to-live and type of service fields
(mangling), or changing source or/and destination addresses (network address
translation). Packet routing can be said to provide three main functionalities in Linux:
1. Denying or permitting packets (whether those entering, or leaving the host). This type
of discrimination allows a host to firewall traffic to and from it. A firewall is a set of
rules a machine uses to make decisions on packets (whether to reject or accept), based
on network layer information. This information is typically which port or address the
packets originated from or to which port or address it is going. In Linux, tools such as
iptables [NTFLTR] provide this functionality.
2. Deciding which address or network device to use for transmitting a packet. A network
device can be a physical device, such as a Network Interface Card (NIC), or a virtual
device, which is the way systems like Linux represent tunnels (e.g. PPP or IPSec). On
a Linux machine, the route tool provides this functionality.
3. Changing some attribute about a packet entering or leaving the machine. This
includes mangling12 and network address translation, already discussed above.

12

Mangling is the process of changing time-to-live and time-of-service information on a packet header.
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Firewalls may make decisions on packets by inspecting the packet header. This is
called static packet filtering [PCWEBa]. Another approach is to make decisions based on
the packet’s activity (and that of related packets) through the various interfaces of the
host machine. This approach is called dynamic packet filtering or stateful inspection
[PCWEBb]. Stateful inspection allows decision to be made on packets based on
previously established or related connections. The conntrack module of iptables is
responsible for this functionality.

2.3.2 Iptables
Linux provides packet routing through iptables on kernel versions later than 2.3
[Russ02]. Iptables is the successor of the userland tools ipfwadm, from Linux 2.0, and the
more recent ipchains, for Linux 2.2. Both of these were based on BSD’s ipfw. Iptables is
a part of the Netfilter framework, which is a set of modules for the Linux kernel (these
modules could optionally be built into the kernel). The Netfilter framework offers hooks
into the kernel’s packet processing mechanism. These hooks differentiate packets
destined for processes within the host, those leaving the host, and those being forwarded
to other network devices or back to the network. The framework also offers a series of
‘chains’ that mark the various stages a packet has reached in the kernel’s packetprocessing mechanism. Associated with these chains are two tables, nat and mangle. Nat
is the Network Address Translation table and is defined for only the PREROUTING and
POSTROUTING chains. Figure 2.3.2-1 below shows these chains and corresponding
tables.
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Figure 2.3.1-1: Iptables chains and tables

On each chain, the mangle table is visited before the nat table, if both exist. All
rules are processed sequentially. Each chain can also be assigned a default target
decision. A target, for most chains, is either ACCEPT or DROP. Other targets are
QUEUE and LOG. The QUEUE target causes the kernel to queue a packet that reaches
that rule. A process on the host machine that has a handle to the Netfilter queue may then
read the queued packet. Netfilter provides a library, ‘libipq,’ through which applications
may read and process queued packets. The LOG target uses syslogd to log packet
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information using the kernel facility (i.e. as kernel messages). The target allows
specification of a priority for these log messages. Iptables also allows the creation of
user-defined tables. In fact, Linux’ Lokkit [RHLa] uses this feature for creating firewalls.
Iptables provides a module, called ‘conntrack’, for tracking connection state. This
module identifies the start of a TCP connection when a SYN packet is transmitted from
one site to another. The connection is considered established when a reply SYN/ACK
packet is transmitted to the site that initiated the connection. The connection is considered
terminated (or closed) when a FIN/ACK – ACK communication is transmitted in both
directions [And03]. A RST packet can also be used for terminating the connection. For a
connection over UDP, the module considers the connection ‘new’ when the first UDP
packet is transmitted from one site to the other. The state of the connection changes to
‘established’ when a UDP packet is observed in the other direction. The connection
remains ‘established’ for a predefined amount of time and times-out (is considered
‘closed’) if no more activity is seen between the two sites.
The conntrack module can also handle ICMP: An echo request packet starts a new
connection and an echo reply packet ends it. Most other echo packets will end the
connection (e.g. ‘net unreachable’ or ‘net prohibited’ packets). ICMP connections also
have a default time out (about 30 seconds). Conntrack will consider a connection
‘related’ if there is already an established connection between the two sites. Thus an
ICMP packet sent by one site to another to confirm the state of a UDP connection will
not generate a new connection under iptables. If conntrack does not know the packet
protocol it uses a default behavior to track connection state. The default behavior is much
like the UDP connection approach explained above.
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Because chains, tables, and rules are traversed sequentially, complicated routing
systems can easily slow down traffic on the machine [And03]. One way of speeding up
rule-processing is to use sub-tables; rather than have all rules exist in one chain or table,
packets can be categorized, and each category assigned a different sub-table, thus
reducing the number of rules that have to be traversed for each packet. Categorizing
packets can be made easier by marking packets that arrive from various interfaces. For
example, packets arriving at a host via ipsec0 (ipsec0 is the virtual interface for an IPSec
tunnel on Linux 2.4 using KLIPS) could be marked to distinguish them from packets
arriving at other interfaces. Later, packets with this mark could be processed in a userdefined table so that other packets do no have to traverse rules intended for a VPN client.

2.4 The Greenpass Project

Dartmouth’s Greenpass project seeks to enhance wireless access control to
networks by introducing decentralized delegated access [Goff04]. Decentralized
delegated access allows network access to be determined by a number of principals
rather than one central authority. In PKI terminology, a principal is any authority that
signs a certificate or vouches for a network user. In the Greenpass project, these
principals are regular network users with delegation privileges. A delegator [Goff04] is
such a privileged user. When a guest wishes to join a wireless network, the guest presents
a certificate that is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (any certificate issuing agent)
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to the Access Point (AP)13. The AP forwards this certificate to a RADIUS (Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service) server [Rig00] [RWC00] [RWRS00]. The RADIUS
server decides if the AP should accept the guest’s request and the AP responds to the
guest accordingly. Guests without the right credentials are shunted to a restricted VLAN
from which they can access only a single delegation website. Here, the guest must make a
request to be granted access by a delegator that they know. Once approved by the
delegator, the guest is given a token as proof of authorization. This token (a web cookie)
is actually a SDSI/SPKI [EFL+99] certificate chain (hereafter referred to as SPKI
certificates for simplicity) showing the relationship between the guest and their delegator.
SDSI/SPKI is a certificate specification (much like X.509) that has built-in support for
delegation in the form of certificate chains.
By restricting network access to permit only authorized guests, the project
enhances the wireless EAP-TLS authentication. The Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) [BV98] is a standard that was originally created for authenticating PPP sessions.
EAP provides a standard for encapsulating various forms of authentication handshakes
including challenge-response schemes, password-based, Kerberos, and PKI-based
methods (like TLS) [SGK+04b]. EAP is a protocol that forms part of the standard called
802.1x for wireless control to Ethernet networks. The Institute of Electrical & Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) defined the 802.1x standards. The IEEE also defined 802.11, which is
the standard for wireless networks, also called Wireless Fidelity (or Wi-Fi). Security
standards for wireless networks are defined by 802.11i, a draft standard. A subset of
802.11i is currently used in networking devices as Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). WPA
client applications on host machines enable network users to communicate with APs to
13

An AP is the point-of-presence for a wireless network.
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negotiate security protocols for authentication and authorization. Figure 2.4-1 below
shows the authentication and authorization process for a network user. The user
communicates to an AP via a WPA client using EAP-over-LAN (called EAPOL). The
AP consults a RADIUS server for approval using the RADIUS protocol. The RADIUS
server responds to the AP and the AP returns an EAP “success” or “failure” to the WPA
client.

Figure 2.4-1: A network user requests permission to join the network. In 802.1x terminology the network
user is a supplicant, the AP is an authenticator, and the RADIUS server as an authentication server. The
user and AP communicate by EAPOL while the AP and RADIUS use the RADIUS protocol. Both
protocols encapsulate EAP messages that, in turn, encapsulate some other authentication protocol such as
TLS. This figure is a re-creation of a diagram from Goffee’s thesis on the same subject [Goff04]. KwangHyun Baek put forward the concept for the diagram.

The Greenpass project can be broadly divided into two components: the RADIUS server,
and the client tools.
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2.4.1 Greenpass RADIUS Server
The Greenpass RADIUS server [Kim04] is built from the open source RADIUS
implementation, FreeRadius [FreeR]. Using an open source implementation has allowed
the Greenpass team to add extra functionality to the server to handle SPKI certificate
chains. Unfortunately EAP-TLS can handle the transmission of X.509 authentication
certificates but not SPKI certificates. This restriction means that in their unmodified
forms, neither AP, nor client machine, nor RADIUS server can handle SPKI
authentication certificates. Rather than require new software, the project presents a
solution in the form of a SPKI cache that the RADIUS server can consult for validating a
guest. Guests present SPKI certificate chains to the AP, via their browsers (a certificate
chain is sent as a cookie), and then present their X.509 Certificates by EAP-TLS. The
SPKI cert is added to the certificate cache mentioned earlier. When the Greenpass
RADIUS server receives a certificate, it first determines if it recognizes the CA for the
certificate. If it does not, it refers to the SPKI certificate cache. If the RADIUS server can
find a chain linking the requestor’s public key to some trust root (a certificate signed by a
trusted CA), then the RADIUS server considers the guest authorized, and informs the AP
that forwarded the request. If no valid chain is found for the guest, then the guest is
considered unauthorized so the AP redirects the guest to a restricted VLAN, as explained
previously.

2.4.2 Greenpass Client Tools
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The Greenpass Client Tools [Goff04] consist of all the interfaces that the
delegator and guest interact with before a guest is granted access onto the network. These
include the Greenpass web application and Python scripts that receive and process a
guest’s request, as well as the caches that hold the SPKI certificates for authorization.
The client tools component is outlined below:
1. Greenpass Web applications: This consists of a set of introductory web pages
accessible from the restricted VLAN; the delegation web page that allows delegators
to examine requests, compare guests’ public keys, and create new SPKI chains for
guests’ future authentication; and a front page that allows delegators and guests to
determine their status in the delegation process. The front page tells guests where to
go to get authorization, as well as provides them with the option of seeing their SPKI
certificate chains in human readable form or deleting all Greenpass related cookies
from their browsers.
2. Enrollment CA: For guests who do not have public keys (do not have X.509
certificates), the introductory page works with a python CGI script to generate a
temporary X.509 certificate that the guest’s web browser installs in the browser’s
keystore. This ‘dummy’ certificate is created to provide the guest with a means of
transmitting a public key over EAP-TLS that can be used to authenticate the guest.
3. There are two caches provided as part of the client tools: an introductory cache and an
authorization cache. The introductory cache stores guests’ X.509 certificates until a
delegator views a guest’s request via the delegation page. The authorization cache
stores SPKI certificates and provides functions to the RADIUS server for verifying
trust paths (chain of certificates to some trust root) for guests’ public keys, verifying
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a guest’s status (authorized or unauthorized), and adding new certificates. These
functions are available by XML-RPC, a set or protocols that allows an application on
one machine to call functions in another application, perhaps on some other machine.

2.4.3 Greenpass guest access procedure
The steps for providing guest access under the Greenpass approach can be
summarized as follows:
1. A guest attempts to join the network and must present an X.509 certificate to an AP.
If the guest has a certificate, the AP obtains this certificate via EAP-TLS and
forwards it to the Greenpass RADIUS server for authentication. If the RADIUS
server recognizes the CA for the certificate or can find a trust path in the
authorization cache it returns affirmative to the AP, which then lets the guest onto the
network. Otherwise either the RADIUS server cannot find a trust path or the client
has no certificate and is shunted off to a restricted VLAN.
2. On the restricted VLAN the client can only access the Greenpass front page (via a
web browser) that explains how the guest may obtain authorization, or the
introduction page where the guest may enroll for an X.509 certificate if they do not
have one. At the front page the guest’s browser is asked for an X.509 certificate. The
Greenpass web application passes this certificate to the introductory cache for a
delegator to review it.
3. A delegator views the guest request via a web browser and approves it. This creates a
SPKI chain from the delegator to the guest, and thus provides a trust path from the
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guest to the delegator’s trust root. The new SPKI chain is then added to the
authorization cache.
4. On the front page the guest is notified that her status is now authorized and is
presented with the SPKI chain as an HTTP cookie. The guest may then reattempt to
join the network. By this time, the guest has an X.509 certificate (it might be a
dummy one created from the Greenpass introduction page), and the AP forwards this
to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server will find a new SPKI chain with a valid
trust path and so instruct the AP to allow the guest onto the network.
5. The SPKI chain on the guest’s machine (as an HTTP cookie) is used to refresh the
authorization cache when it expires.

The Greenpass project places a number of requirements on a wireless network user’s
machine but most of these should not be a problem for many network users:
1. The machine must support EAP-TLS wireless authentication and possess a WPA
client. While most operating systems (e.g. Windows XP) provide this application,
earlier versions of Mac OS X (< X.3) do not have a built-in WPA 802.1x client.
2. The user’s browser must have cookies enabled, and must support client-side SSL.
Most standard browsers support enabling and disabling cookies but not all support
client-side SSL (Internet Explorer 5.2 on Mac OS X still doesn’t for instance).
Fortunately, each platform has at least one freeware browser that supports client-side
SSL (Mozilla browsers support it).
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Chapter 3
The Access Control Service

3.1 Objectives

In constructing the model for the ACS I considered the following ideals:
1. An implementation of the ACS should place few or no software constraints on users’
host machines, besides the need for a VPN client that they would use for network
access. This was desirable because one of the objectives of the project was to reduce
demands on remote network users to find machines that possess one capability or the
other.
2. An implementation should provide some means by which administrators could
specify policies and privileges. Furthermore, if an administrator was not trying to
restrict a resource’s users to a particular application, platform, or location then these
details about a user should be insignificant to the user’s ability to gain access.
3. An implementation should build on current technology (rather than attempt to replace
it). This objective means that implementing the ACS should be feasible and
affordable for an institution.
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3.2 The Model

The access control service (ACS) is made of four primary components: a VPN service, a
database service, an accounting and mediating service, and a web service. The function of
each service is listed below:
I. VPN Service
•

Provides a gateway to the VPN as well as authentication for remote users.

II. Database service
•

Stores account information about each VPN user as well as their privileges, as
specified by administrators.

III. Accounting and mediating service
•

Monitors VPN users’ traffic and identifies when users attempt to connect to
resources.

•

Establishes connections to resources on behalf of valid users.

•

Logs users network activities.

IV. Web Service
•

Provides an interface through which:
1. Network administrators may edit users and user groups
2. Resource administrators may edit user and group privileges for their resources
as well as specify how the accounting and mediating service would mediate
between the resources’ access control systems and the users.
3. Users may view their account information and privileges.
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Figure 3.2-1: Various components of the ACS Framework.

The ACS’ components interact as follows:

1. The web service provides web pages for users and administrators. The web service
stores specifications made by administrators with the database service.
2. The VPN service accepts remote users’ network connections and notifies the
accounting and mediating service
3. The accounting and mediating service identifies the privileges and specification for
each connected user by querying the database service.
4. The accounting and mediating service then sets up rules to track the network user’s
traffic from the VPN gateway to specific resources on the network. These rules will
allow the service to be notified if the user tries to initiate a connection for which the
ACS has instructions to mediate.
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5. When the user initiates one of these connections, the accounting and mediating
service will establish a connection to the resource using the specifications associated
with that user. It will then route the users traffic to that resource through the
established connection.
6. The accounting and mediating service will then begin logging information about the
users activity on that connection (e.g. time of connection and time of disconnection).

3.3 Implementation

Figure 3.3-1: Design for ACS prototype. The circled components are those installed or programmed in my
implementation. The dotted lines between components represent communication, usually by passing
messages.
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My implementation of the ACS (Figure 3.3-1) is not a fully functional version,
but a prototype of what I envision the actual service to be. I built this prototype to aid my
proof of concept and to better understand what issues its construction might present. I
implemented the access control service framework with a Pentium 4 Dell Inspiron
running the Fedora Core 1 distribution of Linux. I chose Linux because of the abundance
of open-source solutions for the various components that I thought would be necessary
for the service. I built Linux kernel 2.4.22 and downloaded and installed all the other
components discussed here. I configured a MySQL database for the database service and
installed and configured Openswan [SWANb] and OpenVPN [Yon04] for the VPN
service. My implementation of the ACS uses IP address to keep track of a user’s activity
and to identify resources on the network.
I wrote two programs to provide the accounting and mediating service (see Figure
3.3-1):
1. A Java database manager called the Accounts Manager (AM)
2. A C++ program called the mediator.

In all of the design choices I considered efficiency because I was aware that
packet processing at the application level (i.e. outside the kernel) could impact network
throughput [And03] [CB97]. It seemed necessary to use identification numbers, rather
than IP addresses or hostnames, because remote users might not connect from the same
site on each visit to the network. Additionally, unsigned integer comparisons were more
efficient than these alternatives. These ID numbers are primary keys in the MySQL
database and are used for comparisons and information retrieval within the mediator
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program as well. In the MySQL database these ids are mapped to usernames and public
key fingerprints. Each fingerprint is a message digest of a user’s public key. Message
digest functions, such as MD5 and SHA1, provide unique hashes for unique messages (in
this case, public keys). I used MD5 as the digest function for calculating a user’s
fingerprint. Once users have connected to the ACS and their id numbers have been
established, the ACS builds mappings between id numbers and IP addresses for the
duration of the users’ connections. These mappings allow the ACS to resolve packet
ownership for routing and mediating purposes.

3.3.1 The VPN Service
The VPN service supports IPSec, IPSec/L2TP and SSL VPN connections. My
implementation of the ACS uses two different open-source VPN servers to achieve this:
Openswan (for IPSec and IPSec/L2TP) and OpenVPN. A kernel module, called KLIPS,
provides IPSec support for traditional (IPSec) VPN tunneling. I used a user-land L2TP
daemon (l2tpd), and Linux’s pppd to add L2TP functionality to this service, if a user
needs it. Jacco De Leuuw has documented how to setup an IPSec/L2TP Linux VPN
server using open source tools [DeL02]. Figure 3.3.1-1 is a schematic of the interaction
between the various pieces that make up an IPSec VPN server.
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Figure 3.3.1-1: Linux VPN Server setup using pppd, user-land l2tp daemon and Openswan IPSec tool.
Reproduced from a similar diagram on De Leuuw’s website [DeL02].

There are several open source implementations of IPSec tools for Linux including
Freeswan [SWANa], Openswan [SWANb], and Strongswan [SWANc]. I chose
Openswan for my implementation though I also experimented with Freeswan and
Strongswan. Freeswan is the predecessor of Openswan and Strongswan so it lacks a few
features that make configuring the tool as a server a bit easier in its successors; it is
somewhat easier to set up Strongswan and Openswan to accept connections without prior
knowledge of client configurations. Strongswan and Openswan are very similar in their
core functionality but differ in parts of their security focus; Strongswan supports a few
more PKI and X.509 certificate functionalities than Openswan. The documentation for
setting up a Linux VPN server [DeL02] tabulates the major differences between the
IPSec tools. For the purpose of my prototype, Openswan was as equally a good choice as
Strongswan.
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I built an Openswan 2.2-1 IPSec server for Linux kernel 2.4.22. Linux kernels
2.4.x and earlier require the KLIPS kernel patch in order to handle IPSec (for Kernel
2.6.x this functionality is built in as 26sec). KLIPS also provides a virtual device
interface for processing IP packets. This allows processes on the machine to refer to each
IPSec tunnel by a device name much like they would eth0 or eth1. KLIPS uses ipsec0,
ipsec1, etc for tunnels. The device driver can handle multiple tunnels under one device
name. In my implementation all client tunnels are accessible via ipsec0 (which
corresponds to eth0) and all tunnels within the private network are accessible via ipsec1
(which corresponds to eth1). My implementation uses Linux’s iptables [NTFLTR] for
routing packets from one service to another (e.g. for routing packets between Openswan
and l2tpd).
Openswan also provides an IKE daemon called Pluto, which handles the
encryption key exchange using a configurable set of algorithms and hash functions
(Openswan 2.2 defaults to 3DES-MD5). I configured Openswan to require user
certificates for authentication.
I created a certificate authority (CA) for the ACS and generated and signed
certificates for all the machines I used in with my prototype. I created the CA and
certificates with OpenSSL [OpenSSL]. On my iBook, I also tried out a free IPSec GUI
application, Ipsecuritas [LBTMO], which has support for certificates (The CISCO Mac
VPN client also supports certificates). Ipsecuritas does only IPSec VPN connections, and
the Panther (OS X.3) VPN client does only IPSec/ L2TP VPN connections. I used
Ipsecuritas to verify that the VPN service worked for either flavor of tunneling.
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Additionally, I set up OpenVPN on the ACS so that the machine could accept SSL VPN
connections as well.
A traditional VPN sever has two network interface cards (NICs), one reachable
through the Internet (or over the less trusted network) and the other on the more trusted
network. Because L2TP/IPSec uses PPP, a client of the VPN server may be assigned a
local IP address after authentication (i.e. an address on the more trusted network) by a
DHCP server. With purely IPSec VPNs, the client can optionally be masqueraded14.
Iptables provides masquerading as part of its NAT package. Iptables’ NAT has fixes for
most of the common problems associated with NAT so protocols like FTP, IRC, and Real
Audio, can work with hosts doing NAT via iptables [NTFLTR].
Linux (and many other operating systems) allow users to enable IP forwarding15
between subnets. This functionality is at the core of most Linux open source VPN
implementations because it allows packets coming to the server from a less trusted
network (or the Internet) to be able to reach the more trusted one solely at the discretion
of the server. My ACS prototype has two NICs, each on a different Dartmouth subnet. In
my implementation neither subnet was more trusted than the other, and both were
reachable from the Internet. However, the same setup applies to the traditional set up (i.e.
where one NIC is on a more trusted network than the other).

3.3.2 The Accounts Manager
14

Masquerading is a form of network address translation (NAT). Please see Chapter 2
for an explanation of masquerading and NAT.
15
IP forwarding is the same thing as ‘bridging’ in Windows (for readers familiar with the
‘bridged connections’ option in Window’s network configuration).
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I wrote a Java application to interface with the MySQL database. The accounts
manager (AM) is responsible for mapping a newly connected user’s information to a preassigned id number and informing the mediator. For example, when Pluto concludes the
IKE phase of an IPSec authentication with a user it should forward the user’s IP address
and certificate to the accounts manager16. The AM retrieves the user’s public key from
the certificate and calculates the MD5 fingerprint of the key. It then queries the database
for an id-to-fingerprint mapping with the given fingerprint. If it can find such a mapping
then the user has an associated object in the mediator’s database. Once the AM has
resolved the user’s id it sends a message telling the mediator that the user is now
connected with the given IP address. The AM sends the message using the ACS syntax
explained in section 3.3.4. An example is given below:

CLIENT 381 {
HOST 129.170.210.183
}
CLIENT 381 UP
Example 3.3.2-1: Sample notification message from AM to mediator service.

The message tells the mediator to update its database for a client with an id 381,
and assign that client an IP address of 129.170.210.183. The last line ‘activates’ the client
object. Upon receiving this message the mediator can add routing rules for the particular
client and perform a network address translation on the client’s traffic if needed.
Activating a client object is an indication that the mediator should monitor the ACS’
16

Pluto does not naturally provide this functionality; it requires a patch to do this.
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network traffic for data from or to the corresponding network user, based on the
privileges of the user. Activating a resource object, on the other hand, indicates that the
mediator should consider the resource available for access on the network.
Under my current design, if the user connects using IPSec/L2TP then after the
IPSec server authenticates the user the l2TP server would forward the username and IP
address assigned to the user. The AM is able to look up the user’s id by username. If it
can find such a mapping, it would construct a message for the mediator as described
above. The same applies to OpenVPN.

3.3.3 The Mediator
The mediator manages the state of each user’s connections to various network
resources. In my prototype, the mediator loads up policies for each user from a file at
start time, and creates objects for users and resources to represent their current states at
any given time. During regular execution, the mediator is usually waiting for an event to
occur. It waits on two classes of events: (1) messages from either the AM for updates to
its objects. (2) Messages about clients’ attempts to connect to network resources. The
mediator has a dedicated port for receiving updates to its internal objects structure. The
mediator uses the conntrack module, provided by iptables, to identify a connection
request from a client (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of the iptables state tracking
module).
I designed the mediator with loadable policy-handling modules in mind. I felt this
approach would provide extensibility to the mediator’s current policy-handling
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capability. My implementation of the ACS handles IP-filtering policies and can proxy
other VPN connections to other subnets or hosts. When a policy-handler is invoked for
the first time, it applies iptables rules to queue client packets that are destined for target
secure servers. Iptables provides hooks for queuing packets for userland applications (the
mediator in this case) through the Netfilter library, libipq, and iptables’ QUEUE target
(See section 2.3.2: Iptables). I make all adjustments to the iptables rule-set using shell
scripts invoked by the mediator through system calls. These shell scripts receive
arguments for a particular client and modify one or more chains and tables with these
arguments.

iptables –t nat –A POSTROUTING –s $CLIENT –d $SERVER –j SNAT –to
$NAT_ADDRESS
Example 3.3.3-1: Sample iptables rule for ‘source’ natting. The $CLIENT parameter is the IP address of
the network user, the $SERVER parameter is the IP address of the target resource on the VPN, and
$NAT_ADDRESS is the IP address to which the ACS will map the user’s traffic for the target resource.

Once the mediator receives a user’s connection-request packet it identifies the
user and destination resource and checks its database to determine if a policy handler is
available for the user’s connection. If no policy handler exists then there is no authorized
connection for the user to the resource and the ACS simply removes the queuing rule so
that packets of this nature are left to the target resource’s discretion (i.e. the resource’s
access control policies). If, on the other hand, such a handler exists, then the mediator
calls the handler with arguments stored with the handler’s declaration, and instructs it to
execute because a connection attempt has been made. The arguments passed to the policy
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handler differ based on the particular handler and allow any policy handler to
discriminate between clients by specifying which credentials the ACS should use for
authentication. In all cases, the ACS has a pool of credentials (certificates and matching
private keys, IP addresses, etc), in its name. The policy handler uses one of these
credentials to authenticate with the target server. When the mediator program ceases
execution, or the C++ client objects are destroyed, the handler is called again to do the
necessary clean up (including removing Iptables rules). I will explain the operation of the
policy handler for two policies that the prototype currently handles:

I. IP-Filtering Handler
In this policy, the target server allows connections from hosts with a specific type of IP
address (or IP addresses from a specific range/pool). The server allows the ACS to use a
subset of its accepted IP pool for remote clients. The handler for this policy keeps a table
of these IP addresses and records those that are in use by a client at any given time. The
argument passed to the handler is a reference to the current table entries (as well as a Cstruct containing information on the user and server that is passed to all policy handlers).
When the handler is informed that a connection request has been made it finds the next
available IP address and adds an iptables rule so that all subsequent traffic from the user
to the server will be ‘natted’ with the selected IP address. If there are no more IP
addresses then the ACS has ran out of available connections to the target server and the
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handler will issue an NF_DROP17 directive for the packet. The ACS will, therefore, drop
all packets to that server from users without an established connection until other users
free up their connections. This behavior is configurable: alternatively the handler can be
instructed to reuse IP addresses when entries in the table ran out. The latter option allows
the ACS to create an unlimited number of connections to a resource. The former
configuration will limit the number of connections from the ACS and so can prevent
possible denial-of-service18 attacks through the service.

II. VPN Handler
In this policy, the target server is a VPN concentrator/server to some subnet, perhaps
within the same network as the ACS. The server machine could even be another ACS.
The ACS has a certificate that is signed by a trusted CA of this target server. The
mediator and uses this certificate to setup a VPN tunnel (IPSec or SSL) to the target
server. Before the tunnel is set up, the ACS blocks all forwarded packets from going
through the tunnel (without this initialization, other ACS clients may access the target
server and the restricted subnet behind it). When the handler is invoked (upon a
connection request by the client), the handler adds a routing rule to the route chain to
exempt the client’s forwarded traffic from the previous restriction rule. Subsequently,
these packets are automatically routed through the VPN tunnel, between the ACS and
target server, to the secure subnet behind the server.
17

NF_DROP and NF_ACCEPT are flags that a process sends to the iptables queuing
handler to decided the fate of a queued packet (i.e. to drop or accept the packet).
18
Denial-of-service (DOS) occurs when a server can no longer accept connections from
users because it is already maintaining the maximum number of connections it can
support. By restricting the ACS to a number of connections at a time, a server will always
have connections available to users who are not requesting access through the ACS.
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The ACS maintains state on all users and resources through client and server
objects. Server and client objects can be ‘activated’ or ‘deactivated.’ A client object
corresponds to a particular network user. Activating such an object means that the user is
currently connected to the ACS. When the user disconnects, the AM informs the
mediator and the corresponding client object is deactivated. Server objects represent
resources on the more trusted (private) network. For these objects, activation means that
the resource is available to receive access requests from network users. It also means that
the administrator of the corresponding resource wants the ACS to mediate on behalf of
the resource’s authorized users. If a server object is ‘deactivated’ then the administrator
does not want the ACS to do any mediation for users accessing that resource. This might
also indicate that the resource is temporarily unavailable (or offline).

3.3.4 Specifying policies
I designed a simple grammar for describing resources, users, the privileges the
users have, the policies used for authenticating the user, and which credentials the ACS
would employ to proxy the user. In the absence of a web service in my implementation,
the grammar serves as a means for specifying policies. The syntax uses a few keywords
and delimiters to mark the start and end of the definition of an object. A parser for the
grammar recognizes three keywords for specifying objects: server, client, and conn. Each
of these implies the declaration of an object if the object does not already exist in the
database, or the modification of the object if the object has previously been created. The
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ACS parser recognizes the delimiters ‘{‘ and ‘}’ as markers for the start and end of the
attributes of an object, and the end of line character as a meta-symbol before a new
declaration. Example 3.3.4-1 presents an example of instructions using the ACS syntax.
SERVER server-id {
HOST IP-address
CLIENT client-id {
CONN {
TYPE IP-FILTER {
SUBNET first-IP-address last-IP-address
UNIQUE
}
}
}
}
Example 3.3.4-1: Sample Server Declaration for ACS input file. All italicized words are variables; an
actually policy file (or message) would have numeric constants in their place. The variables are included
here to clarify the meaning of these constants. All terms in bold face are keywords that the ACS parser
recognizes. Subnet and unique are underlined because a ‘special’ parser is required to recognize these
keywords. These ‘special’ parsers are explained later in this chapter.

The specification in Example 3.3.4-1 declares a server with a particular
identification number and IP address. It then declares a client, also with a particular ID
number, and specifies that the client will be authenticated by an IP-based filtering policy
and so should be assigned an IP address from a range between first-IP-address and lastIP-address. Like the policy-handling mechanism of the mediator, the mediator’s parser
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was also designed with modules in mind. The parser itself must invoke special, more
specific parsers for various policies. Thus when the parser encounters the type keyword.
It looks up the appropriate special parser (in this case the IP-Filter parser), which parses
further specification between the ‘{‘ and ‘}’ delimiters. Again this modularity is intended
to provide extensibility to the ACS, allowing it to parse other policies that may be added
to its capabilities in the future.
In Example 3.3.4-1, the IP-Filter parser recognizes the subnet keyword and stores
the upper and lower bounds that define the address pool. The ACS has a table with
entries for all the IP addresses it can use for its clients and the IP -Filter handler will
search this table within the specified bounds when it needs to assign a user an IP address.
The unique keyword tells the policy handler not to use an IP address that is already in
use. This might be desirable if an administrator wishes to restrict the number of
connections the ACS can make on behalf of its users. Without this keyword, the handler
will first try to assign a client an available IP address and then pick any non-unique one if
all are in use. If a handler picks an IP address for a client object that uses ‘unique’
keyword then a flag is set against the IP address in the ACS’ global table so that other
handlers do not reuse the address until it is freed.

3.3.4.1 The ACS Grammar
The parser uses a grammar of the form given in Table 3.3.4-1 below. A more
accurate grammar is given in Appendix A. I give this simplified version because it
captures the essence of ACS grammar and is much easier to explain.
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<Input File>
<Declarations>

<Declarations>
<Server Declaration> <Declarations>
<Client Declaration> <Declarations>
NIL

<Server Declaration>
SERVER uint
SERVER uint {<Server Definition>}

<Client Declaration>
CLIENT uint
CLIENT uint {<Client Definition>}

<Server Definition>
<Client Declaration> <Server Definition>
<Host Declaration> <Server Definition>
NIL
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<Client Definition>
<Conn Declaration> <Client Definition>
<Host Declaration> <Client Definition>
NIL

<Host Declaration>
HOST string

<Conn Declaration>
CONN {<Conn Definition>}

<Conn Definition>
TYPE uint {<Type Definition>}
<Host Declaration> <Conn Definition>
Table 3.3.4-1: Simplified ACS Grammar for policy specifications. The actual ACS grammar is
defined for files and messages (passed between processes).

Each rule of the grammar consists of a variable (left justified) followed by several
variables and/or terminals that can be substituted for it19. Phrases between ‘<>’ represent
variables of the grammar, and words in bold face represent terminals. Italicized words
represent an entire class of terminals. Thus uint is the class of integers greater than or
equal to 0 (and no greater than 232). NIL means no input text. Each variable begins on a

19

I first came across formatting grammar in this particular way after taking a class with Prof. Bill
McKeeman at Dartmouth College.
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new line. Thus if ‘<A> <B>’ is the right-hand of a rule, then it represent instructions that
take up at least two lines in a valid input file (or message).
The mediator accepts an input file if it can be parsed with the grammar given in
Table 3.3.4-1. Parsing is done ‘top-down’ in the order the file is read. A valid input file
contains 0 or more declarations at the top-level (i.e. outside of any curly braces) of the
file. Each declaration is either for a server or client. Consequently, at the top level the
grammar only permits the creation and modification of client and server objects (the
complete grammar also allows the deactivation and activation of these objects). Both
client and server declarations must begin with the appropriate keyword, and be followed
by an identification number. Optionally, these declarations may include a definition for
the object that must be between two curly braces. The definitions of both types of objects
(servers and clients) may include a host declaration, specifying the IP address of the
object.
The definition for a server may include the declaration of one or more client
objects. Similarly, the definition for a client may include the declaration of one or more
conn objects, which are specifications for the authentication policy the client must satisfy
when connecting to a given server. A conn declaration must include the definition of the
conn object between curly braces. A conn definition may also include an IP address
assignment. The IP address within a conn definition specifies the server; the client of the
conn object is already known from the scope in which the declaration occurs (conn
objects are defined within client object definitions). If the enclosing client definition is
within a server definition then the host declaration is optional; the server for the conn
object defaults to the server in which the client is being defined. This exclusion is not
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specified in the grammar in Table 3.3.3-1 but the parser will reject the input file at
runtime if it cannot resolve a server for any given connection. Appendix A presents a
more complete grammar that my implementation uses.
A conn definition must include a type definition, which is the set of arguments
and details for the particular policy. There are no rules for the variable <type definition>
in the ACS grammar because the parser does not resolve this variable. As previously
explained, the parser invokes a special parser for each specific policy type. The parser
maintains a database of parsers that it may invoke to resolve each specific policy. Thus
when the main parser encounters the ‘type’ keyword, it reads the subsequent unsigned
integer token as an index into its database of policy parsers. The specialized policy parser
will parse the type definition and return control to the main parser. The specialized parser
also returns an indication of success, if it is able to obtain a valid type definition, and
failure otherwise. Example 3.3.4-1 demonstrates the type definition for an IP-filtering
policy.

3.3.4.2 The Web Service (not implemented)
In a full-scale implementation, the web service would provide several web pages
for both administrators and network users. Administrators’ web pages would allow them
to select their resources via web-form objects (e.g. drop down boxes). Administrators
would be able to add new resources or modify the policies for those already displayed by
the website. They would also be able exclude resources from the ACS’ mediation. The
web pages would identify each policy by type (e.g. IP-Filter or VPN) and for each type
would allow the administrator to edit configurations. For example, for configuring a
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VPN’s access policy, the website would present an admin with a form to upload a
certificate and private key file that the ACS may use to establish a tunnel, and select what
type of protocol the resource required for VPN access – IPSec, IPSec/L2TP, or SSL. For
each resource, the Administrator would also be able add or drop which network users she
has authorized to access the resource, and perhaps what type of access privileges these
users may have: For example a user might have administrative access or restricted access,
etc. In this case the administrator would have to provide the ACS with a different set of
credentials for each access privilege type.
I created the ACS syntax for specifying policies in the absence of a web service.
However, I could have added the web service to my implementation by providing scripts
to translate specifications made on a web form into ACS syntax; once the web service
generates the messages, it would send these messages to the mediator the same way the
AM currently does.

Web Form Specification

ACS Syntax equivalent

Prevent the ACS from mediating between SERVER 32 DOWN
users and a particular resource
Add a server as a network resource.

SERVER 35 {

Specify the name and IP address of the

HOST 129.170.214.90

server. State that the server uses SSL VPN

TYPE VPN_SSL {

access control.

CERT /usr/share/acs/certs/cert.pem

Upload a private key file. Upload a

KEY /usr/share/acs/secrets/key.pem

certificate file (The ACS will present these
to gain access for a privileged user)
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}

to gain access for a privileged user)

}

State that the resource is active (i.e. its SERVER 35 UP
available to receive connections for
network users)
Authorize the ACS to mediate on behalf of CLIENT 62 {
a client to obtain access to the server

CONN {

defined above. The client will use the

HOST 129.170.214.90

default settings for establishing a tunnel to

TYPE VPN_SSL {

the server.

}
}
}

Table 3.3.4.2: The web service could generate ACS syntax messages from information gathered from the
web forms. The entries above are examples of this translation.

The web service would also provide web pages for network users to view their
privileges and any other relevant account information.

3.4 Putting it Together
My prototype does not include the web service component identified in the model
for this framework. Instead, specifications are made by means of a syntax that I designed
for allowing the various components to communicate. My prototype also implements the
accounting and mediating service as two separate programs: the Accounts Manager and
the mediator.
The prototype is designed as follows:
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1. The VPN services comprise of OpenVPN, Openswan, l2tpd, and ppd. When a
user connects to the VPN service, it will give the AM some identifying
information about the client (username or X.509 certificate) and current IP
address.
2. The AM looks up the id number of the user with the given identification
information (username or public key fingerprint) by querying the MySQL
database.
3. The AM constructs a message, using ACS syntax, telling the mediator that the
corresponding client object should be activated, as well as providing the user’s
current IP address.
4. With the given IP address, the mediator can add routing rules to queue certain
packets from the user’s traffic based on the destination of these packets (which
resources the client is trying to access). These packets represent connection
attempts.
5. When the mediator detects a connection attempt (i.e. it receives a queued packet)
it establishes a connection with the resource and allows the user to access the
resource through this established connection. The mediator establishes
connections on behalf of a user based on the resource administrator’s
specifications.
6. When a network user disconnects from the ACS, the VPN components will send
another message to the AM with some identifying information for the user (in this
case an IP address). The AM looks up the user’s id with the given information and
constructs a message telling the mediator to deactivate the corresponding client
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object. The VPN services disconnect idle connections automatically so inactive
users do not remain connected to the system.

3.5 Summary
The ACS model presented in this chapter and my prototype implementation have
demonstrated the following:
1. The ACS is able to reduce unintended access denial of authorized users by
mediating connections between users and resources.
2. The ACS endeavors to maintain the security standards of the various network
resources20 because it uses VPN technology, which provides authentication,
confidentiality, and data integrity; users that benefit from the ACS are not only
authenticated but are also authorized to access the resources that the ACS enables
them to.
3. Because the ACS forms an intermediary between resources and network users, it
provides a centralized system for administrators to control access to their
resources in a way that captures the administrator’s intentions for securing the
resource. This point also suggests that resources network-wide may benefit from
new technology introduced to the ACS framework. Chapter 4 discusses how ACS
could be upgraded to work with Greenpass tools and so enable resources on the
VPN to support decentralized delegated access without further configuration.
20

In the sense that it provides direct access to only authorized users. This does not
guarantee the integrity of the data after the host receives it; the ACS cannot vouch for the
security of the host the user is using (see Chapter 4 for further discussions)
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
My prototype deviates somewhat from the model presented at the beginning of
this chapter. This discrepancy is due to the fact that I was able to refine the model only
after considering some of the decisions and their effects on the prototype. For this reason,
the prototype could have had a single program for the accounting and mediating service.
With a single program, the service could read specifications directly from the database
service and there would be no need for a policy specification grammar; while the web
service and the accounting and mediating service would have agree on a format for
storing and retrieving specifications, this format would be a lot simpler than the ACS
syntax that my prototype currently uses.
Besides establishing a proof of concept, I embarked on implementing a prototype
as a way to better understanding what putting together a framework like the ACS would
entail. I believe that my prototype has accomplished just that.
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Chapter 4
Discussions

This chapter answers some of the questions that arise from my implementation. I
will focus on the issues of usability, efficiency, and security, as well as discuss the
improvements to the model, which are necessary for addressing these issues. Before this,
I will explain how the ACS may be made to work with Greenpass tools for introducing
delegated access on the network.

4.1 Delegation

The ACS framework allows multiple resources to be managed centrally. In
particular, enabling the ACS framework to understand delegated access will enable all
services on the network to benefit from delegated access. The ACS model can be
upgraded to support Greenpass tools including RADIUS authentication to the VPN
service and implementing the accounting and mediating service to work with the
authentication cache. These suggestions can also be directly applied to my prototype and
sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 explain what modifications need to be made to enable
decentralized delegated access for network resources.
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4.1.1 Adding RADIUS-server support
1. Openswan supports Xauth. Xauth is a program used to edit and display
configuration information for connecting to an X server [Ful05]. Xauth can be
made to use PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules), an authentication system
that controls access to Red Hat Linux [RHLb]. PAM can also be configured to use
RADIUS authentication so that client certificates can be forwarded to a RADIUS
server for validation. It should be noted that Openswan developers do not
consider the use of PAM with Xauth very safe [SWANd]; only recently, iDefense
published a buffer-overflow vulnerability in Openswan when compiled for
Xauth/PAM authentication [iDFNS05]. In light of this I hope to find an
alternative for authenticating IPSec VPN connections.

2. Linux PPP can be configured to do RADIUS authentication. This functionality is
built-in for pppd 2.4.2 and later versions [DeL02]. For earlier versions of pppd
there are plug-ins available. Because the L2TP/IPSec VPN setup uses Linux’s
pppd, configuring pppd to use a RADIUS server will provide RADIUS
authentication for the VPN connection.
OpenVPN also has a PAM plug-in that can be configured to use RADIUS. This is similar
to approach (1) above. Alternatively, the OpenVPN configuration file provides a number
of instructions that allow scripts to handle user authentication [Yon04]. These scripts can
be used to send a certificate to a RADIUS server for authentication.

4.1.2 Adding delegated-access support
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In order to extend the prototype’s service to delegated users, the AM and mediator
must be modified to understand delegated access: If the AM receives a certificate and
cannot find an id assignment for the user, for instance, then it should query the Greenpass
RADIUS server’s authentication cache [Goff04] (see section 2.4 for information about
the authentication cache). The Greenpass authentication cache API can be modified to
return entire SPKI chains for a given user’s public key. Greenpass currently does not
support delegating a subset of a user’s privileges21, however, there have been plans to
incorporate such a scheme and it is likely that the tag extensions of a guest’s SPKI chain
will convey information about delegated privileges
The prototype’s grammar can be extended to use three keywords, guest, until and
like for representing transient users and privileges. Table 4.1.1-1 shows how these
keywords would work.

Syntax

Interpretation

GUEST 5 {

Create a client object that should be treated

LIKE CLIENT 82

as transient; it will ‘expire’ at the end of

UNTIL 05/01/2005 18:00:00

the date given by the ‘until’ instruction.

HOST 190.181.183.14

Assign this client the IP address

}

190.181.183.14 and accord it all the
privileges of the client with id 82 until it
expires.

GUEST 6 {

Create a transient client object that is valid
until 6pm on May 1st 2005 and with IP

21

It has not been necessary to do this yet since until now the only privilege in question has been network
access and a user either has it or does not
address 190.181.183.15. Use specifications

75for client object 82 only for connections to
a

server

object

with

IP

address

HOST 190.181.183.15

until 6pm on May 1st 2005 and with IP

UNTIL 05/01/2005 18:00:00

address 190.181.183.15. Use specifications

CONN {

for client object 82 only for connections to

HOST 129.170.253.74

a

server

object

LIKE CLIENT 82

129.170.253.74.

with

IP

address

}
}
Table 4.1.1-1: Interpretation of syntax using GUEST, UNTIL, and LIKE keywords.

The ‘guest’ keyword is much like the ‘client’ keyword introduced in Chapter 3.
The difference is that the client object created by a ‘guest’ instruction persists only until
the date and time specified by the ‘until’ instruction. After this time, the corresponding
user’s privileges expire. The client object is, therefore, transient.
The ‘like’ keyword instructs the mediator to use the specifications of some other client
object for the current client object. The other object corresponds to the delegator for the
user whose object uses the ‘like’ keyword.
The recommendations presented in this section would allow ACS to work with
Greenpass tools for delegated access. With this enhancement to the model, users will be
able to delegate their access authorization if they have delegation privileges. The end
result would be a system whereby users can grant temporary access to network resources
in a decentralized fashion.

76

4.2. Usability and Efficiency

4.2.1 Handling larger client load
The ACS does not discriminate based on a user’s location, i.e. it can accept user
connections from within the VPN. This could allow local (internal) network users to
benefit from the ACS’ services as well. Figure 4.2.1-1 shows a network topology with
internal (local) and remote users benefiting from the ACS’s services.

Figure 4.2.1-1: ACS supporting remote and local network users.

At the same time the ACS might potentially have to serve as many people as there
are network users. A network may, therefore, need to support multiple clones of the
various components; an overloaded accounting and mediating service, for instance, could
use port forwarding to reroute all connections to a less busy clone and so balance user
load.
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Large user populations may also create an inconvenience if administrators have to
add and remove users one at a time for each of their resources. Therefore, another logical
improvement to the current implementation would be to include support for user and
resource groups.

4.2.2 Increasing the protocol working set
My prototype of the ACS has been concerned with IPSec, SSL, IPSec/L2TP VPN
policies and IP-based firewall policies. These policies all control access at the network
layer (or lower). However, the ACS model does not restrict service to only network layer
access. Consequently, above the network layer (specifically at the application layer), it
might be necessary to proxy access on an application-by-application basis in order to
extend the implementations working set of policies. I currently have plans to provide a
web proxy approach to handling client-side PKI policies for web servers on the network.
I hope to have enough information about a solution, and a possible implementation,
shortly.

4.3 Security Considerations for the ACS Framework

In my research, I identified that the ACS must be secured against two primary
classes of adversaries: unauthorized network users, and malicious authorized users. The
former have no permission to access the VPN. The latter have authorization to connect to
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the VPN but may misuse their privileges on the network. Alternatively, a malicious
network user could hijack other users’ authorizations and misuse their network privileges.
I also identified that the ACS stores two classes of sensitive information (1) Account
information for administrators and users (2) Private keys and shared secrets that belong to
the ACS. In the ACS model this sensitive information is stored with database service.
This makes the database service an integral part of the framework’s trusted computing
base (TCB) – i.e. the security policies that govern the database service determine the
reliability of sensitive information within framework.

4.3.1 Securing access to the ACS
First, a number of policies could be used for securing access from the web service
and VPN service. For instance, the web interface for administrators could require clientside SSL authentication as well as usernames and password because client-side SSL
authentication uses PKI, which is considered more secure than server-only SSL
authentication or username-password schemes [Hos04].
Second, all network ports accessible from the less trusted network (except those for
the web server and VPN server) could be firewalled. This would leave the VPN and web
services as the only entryway for access from the less trusted network. Because both
services authenticate connections that they receive, all access from the less trusted
network to the ACS or the resources on the network would be authenticated.
Consequently, any malicious user who attacks from the less trusted network must have
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authorization, either hijacked from another user or provided by a network administrator22.
With ‘best practices’23, the probability of a malicious user hijacking another’s
authorization (by stealing their credentials or sessions) could be minimized:
•

The ACS could rely more on PKI (private key and certificate) authentication than
passwords. Where passwords are used, certificates could also be required for
additional security. For example, for authenticating administrators on the web
service.

•

Users should not leave open sessions idle on public machines when they are done
accessing resources. The ACS could help out by causing idle sessions to time-out
(OpenVPN and Openswan already provide this functionality).

•

‘Strong’ passwords could be used for accessing accounts on the web server; the
ACS could ensure that when users and administrators create passwords, the
chosen passwords would not be easily susceptible to dictionary attacks.

Attacks may also be initiated from within the more trusted network or by taking
control of processes within the ACS framework. Various policies could be employed to
limit such attacks as well. For instance, in order to reduce the damage that an attacker
could exact by taking control of a process, the various components of my implementation
ran at user privileges on the Linux box. For example, the MySQL database runs under
user ‘mysql’ privileges, while the web server runs as user ‘www’. This means that even if
both are compromised, they cannot be used to access a substantial amount of system

22

In practice it is virtually impossible to claim that a system can only be compromised by some means and
not by others because the tools and capabilities of malicious network users are constantly improving.
23
‘Best practices’ refers to security measures that are considered most effective in reducing the risk of
attacks. Even the most effective measures are not foolproof.

80

resources. Additionally, on the web interface, the ACS would reduce direct interaction
with the database service by providing HTML form-objects to users. It would be the
results from these objects that would be used for database queries rather than users’
inputs. All processes that send requests to the database service could also escape (i.e.
quote) their queries first. In my implementation, I followed a few other security measures
including removing the ‘test’ database from MySQL (this is a default database that is
usually unprotected), and configuring the server to allow ‘root’ access from only within
the host (i.e. disallowing remote ‘root’ access). There are several other best practices and
security policies for securing a database server [ISS] and any implementation of the ACS
should consider employing these.

4.3.2 Auditing network activity
The ACS framework must provide a way for administrators to audit resource
access activity. The ACS can trivially log each user’s activity because it always maintains
state on the connection of each user. Administrators could be provided with these logs,
upon request, from their web accounts. Additionally other monitoring tools can be used
to filter the logs for inconsistency and suspicious behavior so that administrators might be
notified.

4.3.3 Concerns about binding IP addresses to privileges
My prototype of the ACS authenticates a user, determines the user’s IP address
and creates rules for routing the user’s traffic based on this IP address. Similarly, the
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mediator looks up privileges based on the IP address of an access request packet that it
receives. There are a number of problems with such a design:
•

In the introduction to this paper (chapter 1), I mentioned that there were packet
fragment attacks and IP spoofing schemes to thwart systems that make decisions
based on IP addresses. The current design suggests that malicious users could
employ one of above-mentioned techniques to gain access to resources for which
they did not have authorization.

•

It is not clear how the ACS would differentiate between users connecting from
behind a NAT box under the current design; to the mediator, such users would
appear to have the same IP addresses.

These potential problems arise from the fact that IP addresses are not uniquely
identifying, as are public keys or usernames. Therefore, a mapping from public keys or
usernames to IP addresses loses some information about a user. If the ACS is to continue
using IP addresses for identifying users then some other information must be available
for differentiating between users with the same IP address. I have identified a number of
feasible solutions:

Approach 1:
Users connecting from behind the same NAT box usually have different source
ports associated with them. NAT boxes typically use these ports to uniquely identify each
host (see section 2.2). The ACS could associate users with both IP addresses and port
numbers as unique identification.
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This approach does not prevent a malicious user from spoofing another user’s port
number along with the IP address. However, the ACS’ VPN sever cannot correctly
maintain two tunnels with identical remote IP addresses and port numbers because it
would not know which to use for sending reply packets. It is, therefore, arguable that a
malicious user cannot successfully spoof both another user’s IP address and port number
so this approach may be adequate for uniquely identifying network users.

Approach 2:
Netfilter provides a connection-tracking module that can differentiate multiple
connections between the same endpoints. The module identifies individual connections
based on IP addresses, protocols, ports and other unique identifying information. The
module can be modified to include a unique identification number for each related
connection (i.e. all connections from the same unique user). The ACS always knows
when two users have conflicting IP addresses because two active client objects will map
to the same IP address in its database. In such a situation, the ACS could resolve conflicts
by consulting the connection-tracking module’s logs. The ACS could then determine
which user made the request from the unique identification number in the log.

Approach 3:
Netfilter can mark packets at almost every stage of a packet’s journey through the
kernel’s routing system (see section 2.3). The ACS’ VPN servers are able to uniquely
identify each user even if two users share the same IP address. VPN servers are able to do
this because each VPN protocol must necessarily use some unique identification, other
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than IP-header information, for each user’s traffic. For example, the IPSec protocol
identifies each client’s packet based on an SPI number, which is resolved before any
other header information is used. Similarly, the SSL protocol uses session ids to uniquely
identify connections. Thus, of the various components that make up the ACS, the VPN
servers can best differentiate between packets coming off the VPN tunnel. In light of this,
the servers can be patched to call Netfilter’s mark module to mark each packet based on
the identified user. The servers will communicate this mark as part of the identification
information sent to the AM. This way, the mediator can use both the IP address and the
identification mark of each packet to uniquely identify a user.

4.4 Summary

The implementation employed in this research raises a number of security,
efficiency and usability concerns. In this chapter, I have presented answers to most of the
identified concerns, with a call for further research into any that might not have been
addressed here. In many cases, these concerns are specific to the design decisions of my
current implementation and not the project’s concept (the model) itself. This suggests a
need for more rigorous analysis of each design decision and, perhaps, further research
into alternative designs for the ACS.
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Chapter 5
Related Work

5.1 Napoleon Tools

Napoleon [TOB98] is a policy specification tool for application developers.
Napoleon is built on the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) framework, and is primarily
for CORBA applications. RBAC is designed to aid administrators and developers in
specifying network-wide access control policies. Napoleon provides a set of tools that
integrate the RBAC functionality. While RBAC provides a way for defining and
controlling resource access for network users, it does not work well with legacy
applications that were not built with the RBAC model [TOB98]. Such applications
require RBAC object representation under Napoleon, and this may be sometimes
infeasible. For example, it is not trivial to create an object that captures the complete
functionality of an FTP server [TOB98].

5.2 Integrated Secure Communications System (ISCS) Project

The ISCS [Open+05] is an on-going project that aims to provide easy network
security management. The ISCS will manage firewalls, VPN tunnels, intrusion detection,
virus scanning, application proxying, and user authentication. It currently manages some
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but not all of these security features. The ISCS is not a security tool itself; instead it is a
management system for other open source security tools. Currently, the underlying tools
used are Openswan, Freeswan, Strongswan, iptables, OpenCA, Linux Advanced Routing,
OpenSSH, the ISC DHCP server, and the Strongsec DHCP relay. Because of its
integrated environment and centralized control to network security, measurements show
that the ISCS can cause as much as a 90% reduction in the time taken to configure a
network-wide security system.
The ISCS provides a GUI24 Security Policy Manager (SPM). The GUI allows
administrators to write high-level security policies that are translated into low-level rules
used in firewalls, at VPN gateways, etc. The SPM maintains a database of Accessors
(users) and Accessor Groups on one hand, and Resources and Resource Groups on the
other. High-level administrative policies define how Accessor and Accessor Groups may
access Resources and Resource Groups [Sull04]. The project is fairly new; pre-alpha
releases for ISCS have been available since August 2004 and one white paper is available
on line [Open+05]. No full release is available at the time of writing this paper.
The ISCS promises to provide some of the same services as the ACS:
(1) Both provide a centralized solution for resource administrators to specify policies for
multiple resources.
(2) Both identify resources on one hand, and users on the other, and allow many-to-many
mappings between these sets, where the mappings are access control specifications.
(3) Both can provide more modern and technologically superior security to legacy
systems that may have little or no security at all.

24

GUI stands for Graphical User Interface.
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The fundamental differences lie in the focuses of the two projects: The ACS aims
to make access control management easier for administrators, with an emphasis on
facilitating accessibility for users (even where advanced security is employed). The ISCS
aims at making it easier for administrators to configure policies for large numbers of
security tools, with a focus on allowing corporations to integrate their networks in the
event of mergers, partnerships, and acquisitions. The ISCS project appears to target
businesses more than any other institutional field, identifying that network security
systems of growing businesses undergo large modifications and frequent changes.
Additionally, the ACS allows decentralized network access management: Different
administrators can specify policies on it that affect only their resources. The ISCS does
not provide this kind of decentralized management. Because of this and the differing
focus of the project’s objectives, the ISCS cannot directly provide solutions to the issues
of network accessibility that the ACS seeks to address.

5.3 Globus Project

The Globus Alliance is a consortium of organizations and individuals developing
fundamental technologies for the “Grid” [Glob05]. The Grid is a distributed computing
infrastructure that enables coordinated resource sharing and problem solving among users
across corporate, institutional, and geographic boundaries without sacrificing local
autonomy [FKT01] [Fos02]. The Globus Alliance makes all its technology available in
the form of the Globus Toolkit. The Toolkit provides a framework for building Grid
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applications by providing basic mechanism of communication, security, and data access
[FKT97]. It currently contains C and Java libraries, as well as Java and Python web
services, for resource monitoring, discovery, and management. The toolkit also provides
tools for security and file management across networks.
The Globus project introduced X.509 Proxy Certificates [WFK+04] as part of its
security infrastructure. Proxy Certificates are similar, in structure, to regular X.509
certificates; the main difference is that an end user of a regular X.509 can be the issuer of
a proxy certificate. This allows users to delegate privileges to other users, machines and
services.
The Globus toolkit and Proxy Certificates provide a means for privilege
delegation but do not work with legacy network systems that cannot process Proxy
certificates. In the absence of other infrastructure, therefore, the toolkit cannot provide
solutions to the issues of network access control that this research identifies.

5.4 Now User Filtering Works (NuFW) Project

NuFW is an authentication firewall software suite for Linux [NuFW]. The suite is
built on top of the Linux Netfilter package (see Chapter 2), and uses the connectiontracking capabilities at its core. NuFW provides authentication for each connection to a
machine. It identifies new connections using the connection-tracking module, and so can
differentiate between sessions, and multiple users from the same host or from behind a
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common NAT device. This functionality may enhance security of most firewall systems
that discriminate solely based on IP addresses.
While the suite can provide added security to a gateway, it does not provide any
policy-configuration benefits to administrators. Neither does it appear to enhance
network accessibility. Additionally, the NuFW suite does not work well with destination
network address translation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion

This research has considered several issues regarding VPN access control and
managing multiple resources on a network. As a solution to these problems, this research
offers an access control framework that facilitates VPN user access as well as providing
centralized management for network resources. At the same time this framework, called
the Access Control Service (ACS), provides a means by which legacy access control
systems network-wide can benefit from newer access control technology (such as
decentralized delegated access) with minimal modification. As a proof of concept for the
functionality of the framework, this research also presented a prototype that successfully
facilitates VPN user access to resources using firewall and VPN access control. The
prototype has also served to refine the model for the ACS framework.
A number of concerns about the current implementation have been raised in this
paper, but for each of these the research presented here has offered a practical solution.
Additionally, this work has identified ways of improving the framework while inviting
more research on the identified issues of VPN access control, as well as the solution
presented by the Access Control Service.
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Appendix A
The Complete ACS Grammar

This appendix gives the ACS grammar currently in use by my implementation.
The input may be a file or a message received on the mediators dedicated port. A
message or file is considered ‘valid’ if it contains one or more object declarations at the
top level (outside of any curly braces). The complete grammar includes syntax for
activating or deactivating client and server objects (using UP or DOWN keywords after
identifying the object).
The complete ACS grammar also enforces that a conn object declared within a
client that is defined at the top level of an input must include an IP address assignment
for the server on the other end of that connection.
In this grammar, a server object may include a type declaration. This allows an
administrator to specify a template by which future conn objects can be created for clients
authorized to access the particular resource (the resource corresponding to the server
object).

<Input>
<Declarations>
<Declarations>
<Server Declaration> <Declarations>
<Client Declaration Sans Server> <Declarations>
<Server State Change> <Declarations>
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<Client State Change> <Declarations>
NIL
<Server Declaration>
Server uint
Server uint {<Server Definition>}
<Server State Change>
Server uint up
Server uint down
<Client State Change>
Client uint up
Client uint down
<Client Declaration>
Client uint
Client uint {<Client Definition>}
<Client Declaration Sans Server>
Client uint
Client uint {<Client Definition Sans Server>}
<Server Definition>
<Client Declaration> <Server Definition>
<Host Declaration> <Server Definition>
Type uint {<Type Definition>} <Server Definition>
NIL
<Client Definition>
<Conn Declaration> <Client Definition>
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<Host Declaration> <Client Definition>
NIL
<Client Definition Sans Server>
<Conn Declaration Sans Server> <Client Definition Sans Server>
<Host Declaration> <Client Definition Sans Server>
NIL
<Host Declaration>
Host string
<Conn Declaration>
Conn {<Conn Definition>}
<Conn Declaration Sans Server>
Conn {<Conn Definition Sans Server>}
<Conn Definition>
Type uint {<Type Definition>}
<Host Declaration> <Conn Definition>
<Conn Definition Sans Server>
<Host Declaration> <Conn Definition>
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Glossary

26sec – The native IPSec module of the 2.6 family (2.6.x) of Linux kernels.
ATM – Stands for Asynchronous Transfer Mode. This is a network architecture that uses
fixed-length units (53-byte frames) for data transmission. Because ATM frames are
fixed-length they can be processed quickly. This allows ATM to be used for data transfer
that where speed is a priority (e.g. Audio and Video data).
AH – Stands for Authentication Header. The AH protocol encrypts the payload and some
fields in the header of a packet. It provides integrity for an IPSec packet.
Buffer-Overflow – When a computer program receives input it typically writes this in a
buffer before working on it. Because buffers are fixed chunks of memory, a program that
does not correctly check the size of its input can write beyond the end of a buffer and into
other regions in memory. This scenario is called buffer-overflow. Well-crafted bufferoverflows can cause a program to write new instructions into its memory that can be
executed later.
CHAP – Stands for Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol. CHAP is a standard
for verifying a user’s identity much like PAP. Unlike PAP, CHAP uses encryption for the
username and password by sending the user an encryption key before any further
information is exchanged. CHAP may periodically request re-authentication to ensure
that the user at the other end of the connection has not changed.
CORBA – Stands for Common Object Request Broker Architecture. CORBA is a
specification for an architecture by which applications may communicate in a distributed
computing environment.
Datagram – See Frame.
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DSN – Stands for Dedicated Secure Network. This is a synonym for a leased line.
EAP – Stands for Extensible Authentication Protocol. EAP is a standard used for
transmitting access requests and credentials between devices. EAP provides a framework
by which one device may select certain security parameters (e.g. which encryption
algorithm to use) for communicating with another device. It also supports the
transmission of simple messages to indicate acceptance or rejection. For example, a
wireless device may request network access from an Access Point using EAP, and
receive a ‘success’ or ‘failure’ decision for the request. Similarly, using EAP, one server
may forward an access request to a remote server for authentication and approval.
ESP – Stands for Encapsulation Security Payload. The ESP protocol offers encryption
for the payload of an IPSec packet. It optionally offers integrity if the entire underlying IP
packet is encrypted rather than just the transport-layer data (TCP, UDP, etc).
Eth0 – The name of given to one of the Ethernet network interface cards (NICs) in Linux
systems. Other cards may be assigned eth1, eth2, etc.
Fedora – A distribution of Linux. See http://fedora.redhat.com.
Firewall – A firewall is a set of rules that a device uses to make decisions about packets
based on network-layer information.
Frame – A unit of data transmitted across a network. Depending on the network
protocol, a frame may also be called a ‘packet’ or a ‘datagram’.
Frame Relay – A fast data transfer protocol. Frame Relay avoids accounting and error
checking of data in favor of increased throughput. It is based on X.25 technology but is
not restricted to analog circuitry.
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Freeswan – An IPSec VPN server implementation for Linux. The project has been
discontinued. Openswan and Strongswan have succeeded Freeswan. See
http://www.freeswan.org
GUI – Stands for Graphical User Interface. It usually refers to all that part of an
application that includes windows, buttons, etc, and responds to mouse clicks and key
presses as input to the application.
HTML – Stands for Hyper Text Markup Language. HTML defines parameters (called
tags) for formatting documents displayed in a web browser.
HTTP – Stands for Hyper Text Transfer Protocol. This is the standard used by the World
Wide Web for requesting and transmitting documents over the Internet.
ICMP – Stands for Internet Control Message Protocol. ICMP is used for communicating
errors and control messages. These control messages are typically information about the
state of a host or a connection. Some common ICMP control messages are the echorequest and echo-reply messages. A host sends an ICMP echo-request to determine if
another host is available on the network. The site that receives this message responds
with an echo-reply in acknowledgment.
IETF – Stands for Internet Engineering Task Force. The IETF is an open international
community of network users, organizations, and researchers that is responsible for the
technical management of the Internet. The community publishes standards for protocols
and best practices as RFCs.
IP – Stands for Internet Protocol. IP is a protocol that network-layer devices us to
communicate. Under this protocol, a packet is divided into two main parts, a header and a
payload. The header contains information such as the source and destination addresses of
the packet, as well as the payload length. The payload is the actual data that the packet
transmits.
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IP Filter – This is a policy that makes decisions based on the header information of an IP
packet.
IPSec – Stands for Internet Protocol Security. This describes a standard for tunneling and
encrypting IP packets using two protocols, AH and ESP.
Ipsec0 – the name of the virtual interface assigned to the first IPSec tunnel created in a
Linux system. It may also correspond to eth0. Subsequent tunnels may be assigned
‘ipsec1’, ‘ipsec2’, etc. Linux kernels using 26sec do not provide this interface.
Iptables – A Linux application for controlling the Kernel’s routing mechanism. Iptables
was created as part of the Netfilter project.
Kerberos – A network authentication protocol developed at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT). Under Kerberos, a user is authenticated by a trusted third-party
and issued a ticket as proof of authentication. All servers that recognize the third party
will honor this ticket.
KLIPS – Stands for KerneL Internet Protocol Security. KLIPS is a module, distributed
as part of FreeSwan, which provides kernel support for IPSec on Linux kernel versions
earlier than 2.6.
L2F – Stands for Layer 2 Forwarding. L2F is a standard that Cisco Systems® developed
for tunneling link-layer (layer 2) frames over a point-to-point connection.
L2TP – Stands for Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol. L2TP is an IETF standard that combines
PPTP and L2F.
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LAC – Stands for Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol Access Concentrator. As part of the L2TP
standards, a LAC is a server that tunnels PPP datagrams to another server for
authentication.
LAN – Stands for Local Area Network. A LAN is a cluster of devices that covers a small
geographical area (such as a room or building) where communication between these
devices is not done over the Internet.
Leased Line – Private physical network infrastructure that is managed by an ISP for its
customers. This infrastructure usually comprises of cable, routers, and optical fiber.
LNS – Stands for Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol Network Sever. As part of the L2TP
standards, the LNS receives tunneled PPP datagrams for authentication.
Masquerade – This is a form of Network Address Translation, also called ‘many-to-one
NAT,’ where multiple devices with different IP addresses are made to appear as if
sharing the same IP address.
MS-CHAP – Stands for Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol. MSCHAP is Microsoft’s implementation of CHAP.
NAT – Stands for Network Address Translation. This is a mapping of the fields of a
packet header to another set of fields in which a subset of the source, destination, or port
addresses of the original packet is changed.
Netfilter – An open source project for Linux that provides a framework for managing
firewalls, network address translation, and packet mangling. See http://www.netfilter.org.
Network Address Translation – See NAT.
Network Interface Card – See NIC.
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NIC – Stands for Network Interface Card. A NIC is a device that serves as a computer’s
interface to a network; it is the first part of the computer to receive packets from the
network and the last part to handle packets before they are sent off onto the network.
Openswan – A successor of Freeswan. A company called Xelerance actively maintains
Openswan. See http://www.openswan.org
OpenVPN – An SSL VPN server implementation for Linux, Windows and Mac OS X.
See http://openvpn.net
Packet – See Frame.
PAM – Stands for Pluggable Authentication Modules. PAM is an authentication system
that controls access to Linux.
PAP – Stands for Password Authentication Protection. PAP is a method of verifying a
user’s identity by transmitting a username and password over the Internet to be compared
with a stored username and password on another machine. The username and password is
transmitted unencrypted.
PKI – Stands for Public Key Infrastructure. It is a system that defines a number of
entities (end-users, principals, trusted authorities, and issuers), and provides a framework
for identifying these entities, maintaining confidentiality, and verifying the integrity of
data.
End-User –

The entity that owns a key-pair (public and private key), and a
certificate containing this public key.

Principal –

The entity that signs some data with a key.

Trusted
Authority –

The entity that endorses an end-user’s certificate.

Issuer –

The entity that gives an end user a certificate.
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The system uses structures such as certificates, and revocation lists as part of this
framework.
POP – Stands for Point of Presence. It is the first device (switch, AP, router, etc) on a
network to which a user connects even before authenticating with the network’s gateway.
PPP – Stands for Point-to-Point Protocol. PPP is a standard for creating and running
network protocols over a dial-up connection (e.g. modem cable, telephones lines or any
other serial links).
PPTP – Stands for Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol. PPTP is a tunneling standard,
invented by Microsoft®, which encapsulates PPP in other networking protocols such as
IP.
Process – If a computer program is a set of instructions that a computer can execute then
a process is an execution of that program. As this definition suggests, a computer can
usually create many processes from one program.
Python – An open source object-oriented interpreted language. Python can be interpreted
in most of the common platforms.
RADIUS – Stands for Remote Authentication Dial In User Service. RADIUS is an
authentication, accounting, and authorization protocol for network access.
RFC – Stands for Request For Comments. The RFCs are a series of documents covering
issues concerning the Internet and its usage. The IETF is responsible for gathering and
published these documents.
SA – Stands for Security Association. A security association is a relationship between
two or more entities (i.e. devices, processes, etc) that defines how each entity will use
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security parameters (e.g. number of bits for encryption) and services (i.e. encryption,
hashing, and padding algorithms) to communicate securely.
SDSI/SPKI – Stands for Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure / Simple Public Key
Infrastructure. SDSI/SPKI is a certificate standard that was developed to overcome some
of the shortcomings of X.509. The SDSK/SPKI standard includes support for delegation
and certificate chains.
SSL – Stands for Secure Socket Layer. The SSL protocol defines a method for
authenticating one end of a connection (or optionally both), establishing a number of
shared secrets, and encrypting data between both end-points for the duration of the
connection.
Strongswan – A successor to Freeswan. The Strongswan project differs from the
Openswan project in its goals; Strongswan focuses more on using strong security
authenticating IPSec connections. For this reason Strongswan provides more
sophisticated PKI capabilities than Openswan. See http://strongswan.org.
TCP – Stands for Transmission Control Protocol. The protocol provides a means for
guaranteeing that IP packets are not only delivered, but that these packets are received in
the correct order. The TCP header also allows the specification of source and destination
ports.
TCB – Stands for Trusted Computing Base. The TCB includes all components of a
system that have policies for securing sensitive information that the system uses.
TLS – Stands for Transport Layer Security. The TLS protocol is the IETF’s standard for
SSL.
UDP – Stands for User Datagram Protocol. Unlike TCP, UDP does not provide
confirmation on the receipt of an IP packet. Neither does it guarantee that packets are
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received in the correct order. Like TCP, UDP also provides port specification in its
header.
VLAN – Stands for Virtual Local Area Network. A VLAN is much like a LAN with the
exception that the devices on the network are not necessarily in proximity with one
another (i.e. there are no geographical constraints).
X.25 – A data transmission protocol for analog circuitry. The Consultative Committee on
International Telephone and Telegraph (CCITT) developed the X.25 standard.
X.509 - A digital certificates standard developed by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU).
X server – This is the part of the X Windowing System that interacts with the graphics
hardware to draw windows and receive input from the user on behalf of an application.
X Windowing System – This is a windowing system found on most modern operating
systems. It is used for bitmap display by interfacing with the graphics hardware on behalf
of applications. The system is commonly used over networks with an application running
on one machine but its graphical output appearing on another machine.
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